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INTRODUCTION
Two-and-a-half years ago, Cheryl Hanna had many reasons to be happy.1
At forty-eight, she was a tenured professor at Vermont Law School beloved
by students and colleagues alike. She was married with two adorable children,
Samira and Elias, ages eleven and eight. She had achieved much
professionally with publication in elite journals and was an acknowledged
expert on violence against women. But Hanna was privately battling severe
depression. She had twice voluntarily admitted herself to a hospital for
psychiatric treatment. Shortly after her second hospitalization, she legally
bought a handgun and used it the next day to kill herself.2
People at risk for suicide, like Hanna, should have the option to make it
more difficult for themselves to buy a gun during a suicidal crisis. A simple
change to state law would give individuals the ability to add their own names
into the existing federal background check system and thereby prevent
themselves from buying a gun from a licensed dealer. This legal possibility is
not a pipe dream. During the time that this Article has been in draft, the
ideas advanced here have gained legislative traction across the country.
Several states have drafted legislation. And six states—Alabama, California,
Massachusetts, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin—have introduced
1 Fredrick Vars, A Gun Registry That Could Prevent Suicide, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2017, at A24
[https://perma.cc/CUJ8-CZ2G].
2 Id.
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legislation that would create registries that would give residents the ability to
exercise their right not to bear arms.3 Indeed, this liberty-enhancing proposal
has attracted support from politically diverse constituencies. On January 26,
2018, the Washington State Senate voted unanimously—Republicans and
Democrats alike—in favor of a voluntary firearm waiver bill (on which we
consulted) that went on to become law effective January 1, 2019.4
The individual right to keep and bear arms includes the right of
individuals to make choices about how best to defend themselves—for some
people that means choosing not to keep and bear arms. While we will often
describe our proposal as giving individuals the option to waive their Second
Amendment rights, it can more formally be seen as giving the individuals an
additional way to exercise their constitutional right to not bear arms.5
Government should give individuals the right to commit not to purchase and
possess guns and give them the additional right to credibly communicate that
commitment to others. Just as it is constitutional for individuals to contract
to bear arms,6 it is constitutional for government to allow individual
commitment not to bear arms.
While we will discuss giving individuals a variety of waiver choices, we
will focus attention on an Internet platform that gives individuals: (1) an
all-or-nothing option of registering to cede their right to purchase or
possess firearms, (2) the option to automatically rescind any prior
registration after a 21-day waiting period, and (3) the option of providing
email addresses that will be automatically notified of an individual’s waiver
or its subsequent rescission. Because our proposed system would give
waiving individuals the option of automatically regaining full rights to
purchase and possess firearms after 21 days, our proposal is equivalent to
giving individuals the right of opting into a waiting period, a fully
constitutional commitment technique already employed in a number of
states.7 In a sense, our proposal provides individuals with a virtual gun safe:
3 See S.B. 5553, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); A.B. 1927 (Cal. 2018); H.R. 3611, 190th
Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.B. 0671, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2017); Assemb. B. 579 (Wis. 2017).
4 S.B. 5553, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
5 See generally Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012).
Even if a positive constitutional right not to bear arms does not exist, states can still offer this option
without running afoul of Second Amendment rights.
6 See, e.g., id. at 4; see also Kansas Community Requires Households to Have Guns, USA TODAY
(Nov. 23, 2003), https://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-11-23-kansas-guns_x.htm [https://perma.cc/
835C-6UK4] (“Residents of this tiny south-central Kansas community have passed an ordinance
requiring most households to have guns and ammunition”); Town in Utah Requires Owning Guns,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2000), https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95092&page=1 [https://perma.cc/
NJ99-BTLE] (“A tiny southern Utah town has passed an ordinance that requires every household to
own a gun and ammunition so residents can protect themselves against aggressors.”).
7 Many states require a waiting period before couples may finalize a no-fault divorce. See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.9f (West 2018); 23 PA.CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(c) (West 2018);
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by registering for self-exclusion, they can commit to safely being
dispossessed of firearms with the waiting period representing the time
needed to reopen the legal lockbox. Indeed, the state might give registering
individuals a more literal lockbox, by offering to store any firearms with
local police while a registration is in effect. The state routinely creates
“sticky” rights—such as marriage—where reversing an initial exercise
requires time or effort.8
This Article details how modest changes to state law could create these
new rights by allowing individuals to add their names to the existing
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).9 The NICS
“No Guns” list already prevents certain individuals (like convicted felons)
who are prohibited from possessing guns from purchasing firearms.10 The
NICS statute gives states the option of adding new categories of its
residents to the federal “No Guns” list (and states have already exercised
this option by passing statutes which have added more than 1,000,000 new
individuals to the federal list). By passing a statute that prohibits voluntary
registrants from purchasing and possessing guns (and forwarding the
registrants’ names to NICS), states can create a credible system whereby
registrants will be incapacitated from purchasing a firearm from gun dealers
not only in their state of registry but throughout the country. Far from
creating a huge new federal bureaucracy, our proposal imposes no additional
burdens on gun dealers and merely requires a credible mechanism for
registration—something that has been accomplished by hundreds of online
finance and commerce websites as well as several online government portals
administered by the IRS and the Social Security Administration.11
Facilitating these options to waive and to communicate such waiver is likely
to produce three social benefits: (1) self-exclusion, (2) negotiated exclusion, and
(3) political expression. First, the waiver right will reduce gun violence as those
who rationally want to limit their future selves from misusing guns will be able

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-34 (West 2018). These waiting periods have been enforced by courts.
See Hood v. Hood, 397 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Jopling v. Jopling, 526 N.W.2d 712,
714 (S.D. 1995).
8 See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032,
2084 (2012) (discussing testing prerequisites to contracting).
9 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM
(NICS) OPERATIONS (2017), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/2017-nics-operations-report.pdf
[hereinafter F.B.I.]. Alternatively, states with their own existing background check system could use
those systems rather than NICS. The big downside of using state databases is that they will not have
extraterritorial effect. In other words, a resident of Vancouver, Washington, could effectively
“rescind” the waiver and immediately purchase a firearm simply by driving across the border to
Portland, Oregon.
10 Id. at 15.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 24–25 (discussing these government portals).
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to tie their hands against future misuse. Just as state gambling self-exclusion
registries allow individuals to commit not to gamble at casinos in the future,12
a “No Guns” registry allows people to self-exclude from the dangers of gun
ownership. The “No Guns” registry would be particularly attractive to people
with mental health problems that put them at heightened risk of suicide. The
story of Ulysses tying his hands to the mast is a frequent metaphor for
precommitment proposals,13 but the analogy is especially close because Ulysses’
present self was worried that his future self would become delusional and do
harm to himself or others. There are hundreds of thousands of people in the
United States suffering from mental health illnesses who realize during
moments of clarity that their future selves are at risk of misusing firearms. In
this Article, we detail the results of a new survey in which more than forty
percent of people who self-reported that they had been previously “diagnosed
with a mental disorder” indicate that they would be willing to waive their rights
to bear arms.14 Over 20,000 Americans kill themselves each year with
firearms.15 One study estimated that a person’s risk of suicide in California in
the first week after a gun purchase is fifty-seven times the rate in the general
population.16 This proposal would not only incapacitate registrants from
purchasing firearms, but also expose registrants to the risk of prosecution,
further deterring firearm purchase or possession.17 Based on our surveys and
ancillary empiricism, we conservatively estimate that a self-exclusion registry
would annually save hundreds of lives.
Second, the right to credibly communicate one’s waiver can facilitate
negotiated-exclusion and thereby enhance libertarian autonomy. Our
proposal would also give individuals registering for the “No Guns” list the
option of including email addresses of individuals or entities that the
participants want to receive notice of waiver and of any subsequent rescission.
12 IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET
THINGS DONE 142-43 (2010).
13 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS (2000); see also Gharad Bryan, Dean Karlan & Scott Nelson, Commitment Devices, 2
ANN. REV. ECON. 671, 674-75 (2010) (providing contemporary examples of precommitment).
14 See infra Figure 2.
15 See Suicide and Self-Inflicted Injury, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/suicide.htm. [https://perma.cc/QUV3-9WF3] (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
16 See Garen J. Wintemute et al., Mortality Among Recent Purchasers of Handguns, 341 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1583, 1583 (1999).
17 Based on rough estimates, the federal mental health prohibition on both purchase and possession
prevents significantly more suicides than the effective prevention of purchase alone. See Fredrick E. Vars
& Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 22
(2013) (reporting figures implying over one thousand lives saved from the purchase and possession
restriction); Fredrick E. Vars & Griffin Edwards, Slipping Through the Cracks? The Impact of Reporting Mental
Health Records to the National Firearm Background Check System (unpublished manuscript at 15) (on file with
author) (estimating 750 lives saved from purchase-only aspect of restriction).
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Providing the email address of a healthcare professional can not only provide
immediate information about a patient’s risk profile, but also alert the
professional if the patient subsequently chooses to rescind his waiver. The
health care professional would have twenty-one days to inquire whether the
rescinding patient was likely to be a danger to himself or others.18
This option to credibly communicate whether one has waived can also
facilitate informed association. Currently, the association marketplace is
skewed because it is far easier to demonstrate that one is exercising the right
to bear arms than that one is exercising the right not to bear arms. A condo
association that wants to require gun possession—because the association
believes gun ownership deters crime in common areas, for example—can
require that residents physically reveal to management the presence of a
firearm in their unit.19 But without a registry it would be more difficult for an
association to verify that residents do not possess firearms. Our proposed
registry evens the evidentiary terrain.
The Article describes why cotenants, landlords and homeowners’
associations, as well as life and property insurers, have legitimate self-defense
interests in conditioning their association on other people’s waiver of the right
to purchase and possess firearms. Individuals who by themselves would not be
willing to self-exclude from gun ownership may voluntarily opt to waive their
firearm rights in order to secure particular associational opportunities. Just as
citizens routinely waive their First Amendment free speech rights in order to
associate with the government,20 a government sponsored “No Guns” registry
with optional email notices to third parties can promote social welfare by
forcing Second Amendment rights to compete with the First Amendment.
This Article’s notion of gun control is “libertarian” not only in that it gives the
individual enhanced rights to durably commit to not bear arms, but also in that
it allows others to condition their association on such waiver. Opening up the
individual’s arming decision to the associational marketplace might save
annually not hundreds, but thousands of lives lost to gun violence.
18 One might imagine over time that the standard of care for physicians might be not only to
offer registration options for at-risk patients, see infra note 41 (quoting the Massachusetts registry
bill), but also for physicians to inquire about an at-risk patient’s mental health after receiving registry
notice that such a patient had begun the process to rescind his waiver (or had attempted, while
registered, to purchase a gun). See Matt M. Longjohn & Katherine K. Christoffel, Are Medical
Societies Developing a Standard for Gun Injury Prevention?, 10 INJURY PREVENTION 169, 172 (2004)
(detailing evolving standards of care of fourteen societies regarding gun injury prevention).
19 Discrimination based on firearm ownership or nonownership is not prohibited under federal
law. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
20 Such free speech waivers occur for example when individuals sign nondisclosure agreements
as a condition of employment or coventuring. See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. United States, 695
F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (D.D.C. 1988) (“While all governmental employees enjoy First Amendment
rights, those with access to classified information must accept a different application of free speech
protections.”).
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Third, and finally, the right to credibly communicate one’s waiver can also
facilitate political expression. The option to register to waive one’s rights
publicly might be used to send a signal to fellow citizens and to
representatives the registrants’ support of legislative action to limit gun
violence. By disclosing the total number of waivers, the registry could
publicly signal aggregate support while preserving individual anonymity.
Moreover, a registering individual could also provide the email address of
private gun control groups and, by registering for the “No Guns” list,
simultaneously add their name to a private petition. The “No Guns” list could
thus become a particularly powerful way to publicly show support by
signaling the number of people who were willing to waive their Second
Amendment rights. We present below results of an Amazon MTurk survey
indicating that close to a third of respondents were willing to add their name
to their state’s “No Guns” list. Mass shootings predictably lead some
segments of the population to purchase weapons. But after Newtown or Las
Vegas, other segments of the population want to be able to do something to
express their support for gun control laws. The ability to give up your right
to bear arms could thus be a way for like-minded Americans to make common
cause and express solidarity with one another.
While our proposal would allow a waiving party to credibly communicate
his or her waiver to any and all recipients, we simultaneously recognize that
allowing some third parties to condition their willingness to associate
(including economically associate via contracting) raises constitutional
concerns. Specifically, unfettered associational waiver discrimination facilitated
by the state action of credible communication might unduly burden an
individual’s Second Amendment rights. We therefore propose banning
economic associational discrimination based on whether or not a person has
waived—except for explicitly predefined individuals who have plausible selfdefense interests in refusing to associate with someone who hasn’t waived.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I describes
the details of the proposal. This Part will describe how an Internet platform
might verify the identity and secure the assent of waiving individuals as well
as discuss different ways of structuring choice. We will also detail the
variations found to date in the six different state bills proposing waiver
registries. The history of this drafting process supports the notion that this
laboratory of democracy is a place of remarkable invention—as lawmakers, like
Washington Senator Jamie Pedersen, conjured new implementations that had
not occurred to us (or other academics across several seminars).
Part II presents the theoretical case for why people might willingly volunteer
to waive their rights to bear arms and provides the results of two different surveys
estimating the potential demand for waiver. Part III then considers constitutional
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and policy concerns raised by our proposal— including, inter alia, whether and
when a laissez-faire associational marketplace would unconstitutionally burden
Second Amendment rights, and whether private associational choices even
trigger Second Amendment analysis. Part IV discusses implementation of our
proposal using states’ existing option of adding “No Guns” registrants as an
additional “state prohibitor” category to the NICS list.
Our registry gives new meaning to the term “self-defense”: instead of
thinking solely of how we can best protect ourselves from others, our proposal
gives individuals a new way to be protected from themselves. The registry
thus facilitates what Heller identified as the “core” and “central component”
undergirding an individual’s Second Amendment right by allowing
individuals to be better in charge of their self-defense choices.21
I. SCOPE
While the idea of a waiver option as a liberty-enhancing device is readily
understandable, important questions remain concerning the scope and
specific means of how a waiver option would be implemented. This part
describes and defends the structure of the “No Guns Registry” model statute
that we have drafted and included in the Appendix. However, as we will see,
the process of collaborating with state legislators who have introduced this
idea in bills in six different states has led to important variation with regard
to the speed of rescission’s effectiveness, the duties of mental health
professionals to refer patients to the registry and limitations on the email
option. This experience underscores both that reasonable people can differ as
to logistics and that state legislatures as laboratories of democracy remain
substantial sites of innovation.22
A. Registration Access and Informational Prerequisites
To begin, it would be essential for waiver procedures to attend to three
different informational prerequisites. The registry platform should credibly
(i) verify the identity of the person waiving, (ii) prevent unauthorized
disclosures, and (iii) inform the individual of the legal effects of waiver.
Verifying the identity of the person waiving is essential to preclude a
kind of identity theft where imposters maliciously waive another person’s

21 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (identifying “self-defense” as
the “the core lawful purpose” of gun possession); id. at 599 (“central component”).
22 See ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE
AMERICAN STATES 13-14 (2007) (“The notion that the states are laboratories of democracy posits
that innovative policies can be implemented in the individual states and then disseminated if they
prove successful.”).
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Second Amendment rights. Identity verification is also essential to prevent
well-meaning family and friends from registering loved ones in crisis.
Credible online verification systems already exist in a variety of other
circumstances. For example, the IRS has a mechanism for verifying an
individual’s identity as a prerequisite for receiving an “Identity Protection
Personal Identification Number” that is needed to electronically file tax
returns.23 The IRS verification process requires individuals to respond to a
confirmation email and supply their Social Security number, date of birth,
filing status, and the mailing address from their most recently filed tax
return. In addition, the platform requires individuals to answer personal,
financial, and tax related questions to confirm identity.24 In contrast, the
Social Security Administration’s online mechanism for verifying identity as
a prerequisite for receiving a full benefits statement only requires providing
a valid email address, a Social Security number, and a U.S. mailing address.25
In both settings, the prospect of ex post criminal punishment does some of
the work in deterring “spoofing” ex ante.
A third online option is electronic notarization using a webcam. Virginia
in 2012 became the first state to provide that the signer and notary could be
in different locations.26 Non-Virginia residents can apparently take advantage
of this provision and have the notarization recognized in their home states.27
We find no case law on point, but state statutes generally recognize out-ofstate notarizations, which the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution may require.28 Notarize.com has been operating on this model
since 2015.29 But even if states can and do eschew remote online notarization
generally, a state would be free to recognize such notarization for purposes of
“No Guns” registration.
The state of Washington’s implementation of the registry verifies user
identity by requiring registrants to file “a voluntary waiver of firearm rights
with the clerk of the court in any county” and requires that the clerk “must

23 INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., The Identity Protection PIN (IP PIN),
https://www.irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/the-identity-protection-pin-ip-pin
[https://perma.cc/4QSA-ASJN] (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
24 For example, one of us (Ayres) was asked to answer the multiple-choice questions, “Which
of the following was the property tax amount for [home residence] for the 2000 tax year?” and
“When did you SELL the property at [investment property]?”
25 U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Sign In or Create an Account (last visited Feb. 6, 2019),
https://secure.ssa.gov/RIR/CatsView.action [https://perma.cc/R4EF-NDKW].
26 Virginia Company Launches Online Notarization Service, 33(10) LAWS. PC 9 (Feb. 15, 2016).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Notarize and Eagle Home Mortgage Join Forces to Complete a Fully-Digital Mortgage Closing in Texas,
BUSINESSWIRE (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180830005796/en/
Notarize-Eagle-Home-Mortgage-Join-Forces-Complete [https://perma.cc/Z4BJ-DERS].
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request photo identification to verify the person’s identity prior to accepting
the form.”30 Offline verifications like Washington’s, or accepting mailed-in
notarized forms,31 may entail lower risk of registration identity fraud than an
online interface. However, a well-designed web-based identity verification
system should be able to reduce the risk of fraud to a minimum. And given
the reversible nature of sign up, a small risk of fraud may be acceptable. More
importantly, a web-based approach has the potential for much higher
participation and saving many more lives.
The second information requisite concerns data security. It is important
that the waiver platform be adequately secured from cyber attacks and other
unauthorized disclosures of information. Without adequate assurance of such
security, some individuals will forego registering for fear that their lack of
firearm protection will become publicly known, making them targets of
crime. While we have become inured to stories of mass disclosure of private
information from both government and nongovernment databases,32 security
protocols and encryption algorithms have been developed to reduce the risk
of mass publication of the registry.33 The existing NICS already takes
“extensive measures” to ensure the security of system information.34 To
ensure that the NICS is not used to establish a federal registry of those who
have purchased a firearm, all information about inquiries resulting in an
allowed transfer are destroyed prior to the start of the next NICS operational
day.35 Moreover, under NICS regulations, gun dealers (“Federal Firearms
Licensees”) are only authorized to query the system for the sole purpose of
determining whether the firearm transfer is allowed, and are prohibited from
disclosing that bare yes–no information to others.36
Third and finally, it is essential that any system securing waiver consent
adequately inform the individual of the legal consequences of such waiver. Before
signing, individuals should be made aware, not only that waiver will bar them
from possessing or purchasing firearms, but also of the definition of “constructive
possession;” the potential criminal penalties for possessing or attempting to
purchase; the ability of police to query the NICS as part of their enforcement

S.B. 5553, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. Sec. 1 (Wash. 2018).
Offline notarization was the original proposal. See Fredrick E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun
Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465, 1484 (2015).
32 See Ian Ayres, Contracting for Privacy Precaution (and a Laffer Curve for Crime), 45 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 123, 126 (2016) (providing examples).
33 See, e.g., U.S. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., The Security Content Automation
Protocol (2016), https://scap.nist.gov/ [https://perma.cc/75FW-KCMM].
34 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NICS Fact Sheet, https://ucr.fbi.gov/nics/generalinformation/fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/RM7L-EXMJ] (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
35 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 25 (2018) [AG Order No. 2186–98].
36 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NICS FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEE MANUAL 17-28 (2011).
30
31
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efforts;37 the automatic twenty-one-day waiting period for subsequently
rescinding waiver; and the potential legal and nonlegal consequences of providing
email addresses to the platform—detailing the purposes to which addressees can
and cannot legally use information related to waiver.
To assure that such disclosure is effective, government should undertake
ongoing tests of the registry’s users. Just as ad substantiation helps to assure
that advertisements do not leave potential consumers with false
impressions,38 “consequence substantiation” could help assure that the
registry does not leave registrants with a false impression of legal effect of
waiver. The platform might provide specialized warnings about unexpected
adverse consequences.39 One might even imagine forcing registrants to pass
a test establishing requisite knowledge of the possible consequences of waiver
before allowing a registration to become effective.40
While not a formal informational prerequisite, enlightened policymaking
should also be attuned to informing both the general public and at-risk
subpopulations about the waiver option. Massachusetts has led the nation
here and helped us see the value of requiring acute-care hospitals and satellite
emergency facilities to provide individuals reasonably believed to be suffering
with depression with the opportunity to register.41 The Commonwealth bill

37

See 28 C.F.R. § 25.6 (2018):
(1) Providing information to Federal, state, tribal, or local criminal justice agencies in
connection with the issuance of a firearm-related or explosives-related permit or
license, including permits or licenses to possess, acquire, or transfer a firearm, or to
carry a concealed firearm, or to import, manufacture, deal in, or purchase explosives; or
(2) Responding to an inquiry from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives in connection with a civil or criminal law enforcement activity relating to
the Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. Chapter 44) or the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C.
Chapter 53); or,
(3) Disposing of firearms in the possession of a Federal, state, tribal, or local criminal
justice agency.

38 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 590-91 (2014) (discussing the FTC requirement that “advertisers and ad agencies have
a reasonable basis for advertising claims before they are disseminated”).
39 See id. at 595, 601 (proposing “term substantiation” and warnings for unexpectedly adverse
contractual terms).
40 See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032,
2076-80 (2012) (discussing testing prerequisites to contracting).
41 Consider the following language:

Chapter 111 of the General Law is hereby amended by adding the following section:
Section 237. A person voluntarily presenting in an acute-care hospital or a satellite
emergency facility who is reasonably believed by the treating clinician to be suffering
from a diagnosis of depression, using standardized definition of such diagnosis as set
forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as published by

932

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 921

would also require state-funded suicide hotlines to inform callers about the
registration option.42 We have incorporated these provisions into our model
statute43 and required that Department of Motor Vehicles provide the
registration option (just as DMVs have become focal points for organ
donation and voter registration and other dimensions of citizen choice).44
B. Choice Architecture
In addition to assuring the information integrity of the platform, it is
necessary in designing the platform to decide what kinds of options to
provide to individuals.45 Conceptually, a registration system could provide a
dizzying array of choices concerning the types of firearm rights that are being
waived,46 the durability of such waiver, and even whether such waiver is
conditioned on the waiver choices of others.47 As a general matter, we have
opted for reducing the number of choices—for example, by providing an allor-nothing choice to waive purchase and possession rights instead of giving
individuals the additional option to waive just the right to purchase. We favor
the American Psychiatric Association, shall be presented with the form provided for
in section 167A of chapter 6.
H.R. 3611 §2, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017).
42 H.R. 3611 §5, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017) (“Notwithstanding any general or special law to the
contrary, any suicide hotline maintained or operated by any entity funded in whole or part by the
commonwealth shall refer callers to the form provided for in section 1 of this act.”).
43 The California bill included nearly identical language but described the health provider
referrals as a “best practice.” A.B. 1927 § 1, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
44 See Appendix Model Act § 7; see also Hayley Cotter, Note, Increasing Consent for Organ Donation:
Mandated Choice, Individual Autonomy, and Informed Consent, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 599, 614 (2011) (noting
that the DMV is currently the main venue in which organ donation decisions are registered).
45 Since the no-guns waiver is a kind of commitment device (making it harder for a waiving
individual to purchase or possess firearms in the future), it should be surprising that the choice
architecture decisions discussed in this section are analogous to many of the choices confronted in
the commitment contracting platform, stickK.com (cofounded by Ayres). Just as with stickK
contracts, the platform had to confront questions concerning the scope of the commitment and the
consequences of breaking the commitment, as well as identify the person who will decide whether
the commitment has been achieved, and who will be notified of the commitment’s success or failure.
See AYRES, supra note 12.
46 For example, one might allow registrants to choose whether they want to waive their rights to long
firearms as well as handguns or whether they wish to waive their rights to concealed as well as open carry
or whether they wish to retain the right to rent and use firearms at shooting ranges. While it might seem
that shooting ranges could be exempted without risking loss of life, ranges have, as an empirical matter,
been a site of many suicides. See e.g., Mark Feldmann, Officials Struggle with Spate of Suicides at Shooting
Range, THE J. TIMES (May 27, 2016), http://journaltimes.com/news/local/officials-struggle-with-spateof-suicides-at-shooting-range/article_73b1bce4-a8fc-527a-994e-17a51852fce1.html [https://perma.cc/
GD7P-MQPW] (reporting that five people at a single gun range in Wisconsin killed themselves with rented
guns between 2009 and 2016).
47 Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting Voting Mechanisms
19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 17 (2017).
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this numerus clausus approach for standard “Paradox of Choice” reasons and
because we speculate that allowing more limited options will increase the
salience and social meaning of registering.48 But reasonable people can
disagree not only on how many choices to offer, but on which particular
choices should be included in the choice menu. In this section, we explore
some of these choices and describe our reasons for crafting the choice
architecture of our preferred platform (also reflected in the model state
statute included in the Appendix).
Qualifications. Our model statute would “allow any person residing in the
United States” to register on that person’s respective state’s registry. While a
state might alternatively restrict registration to its residents, opening
registration to out-of-state residents would allow such residents to commit not
to purchase or possess firearms in that state and all other states with similar
registry laws.49 Such a commitment might be valuable for nonresidents who
regularly vacation in the registry state. In what we view as perhaps the worst
example of state innovation, Massachusetts’ bill requires individuals registering
to acknowledge that they have “a psychiatric disability and [are] a danger to
themselves.”50 This acknowledgment unreasonably discriminates against
individuals who do not fit within these qualifying categories. Moreover, it would
needlessly stigmatize registrants and depress registration without any credible
offsetting benefit. We certainly don’t mean to suggest that this was the intent of
the drafters of the Massachusetts bill. To the contrary, the Massachusetts bill
was drafted in response to a horrible tragedy involving both mental illness and
extreme suicide risk.
Purchase and Possession. We propose giving individuals the all-or-nothing
choice to waive their rights to both purchase and possess firearms.51 There is a
plausible case for limiting the scope of waiver to just purchases.52 Waiving the
rights of people to possess as well as purchase guns may deter some people from
utilizing the waiver, and it may be difficult for police to effectively enforce a

48 See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS, 3 (2004)
(“[T]he fact that some choice is good doesn’t necessarily mean that more choice is better . . . . [T]here
is a cost to having an overload of choice.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2000)
(explaining that the “numerus clausus” principle means “property forms are fixed and limited in
number”). See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
49 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
50 H.R. 3611 § 1, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017).
51 Our model statutes include even gratuitous transfers of firearms to waiving individuals
within the meaning of “purchase.”
52 Vars, supra note 31, at 1469 n.31.
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waiver of the right to possess.53 To date, only one state registration bill has
included a waiver of the right to possess as part of registration.54 Barring
purchase but not possession is novel, but a state can obviously use its own
background check system however it likes. The problem with purely state
systems is that they apply only within each state. Integrating the state registries
with NICS is important, because integration would stop registrants from being
able to purchase firearms from any gun dealer in the country.55 Fortunately,
NICS expressly allows states to maintain their own integrated database with
names of individuals prohibited from possessing guns for state-law reasons.
Most of the state bills, accordingly, use this part of the federal NICS database.
There is a wrinkle: NICS prevents purchase only where “receipt” of a firearm
is unlawful. Effectuating a purchase-only restriction through NICS requires
some finesse: prohibiting taking a gun but not holding it. In contrast, a
purchase-plus-possession restriction is straightforward.
Notwithstanding the failure of states to adopt our broader waiver proposal
as of yet, there remains a strong policy argument for including possession
rights in the waiver decision. Waiving the right to purchase will not by itself
produce a safer environment for registrants who already have access to
firearms. And waiving the right to possess might give registrants additional
ability to bargain with loved ones for reduced access to firearms in their
shared homes. Moreover, as discussed below, our experimental survey found
no statistical difference in willingness to waive “purchase and possession”
rights versus just “purchase” rights. So at least in this initial experiment, there
was no reduction in willingness to waive when no possession is included in
the waiver provisions.56

53 If state law enforcement found someone in possession of a firearm and suspected they might
be barred under our model statute (or other law), they could report that to ATF. ATF could then
inquire whether the person was in NICS. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(j)(2) (2018). Possession might not be
illegal under federal law, but transfer to that individual by a licensed dealer (or other person, 18
U.S.C. § 922(d)) would violate federal law, thus providing adequate foundation for the ATF inquiry.
54 H.B. 101 Reg. Session 2019 (La.). Compare, e.g., Assemb. B. 1927 § 1, 2017-2018 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (purchase).
55 See infra text accompanying note 173 (discussing the nationwide effect of registrants as
“state prohibitors”).
56 Notwithstanding these arguments in favor of allowing a possession waiver, one of us has
serious reservations. An individual who waives their right to possess a firearm and then acquires
one with suicidal intent arguably belongs in treatment, not in prison. Cf. Fredrick E. Vars & Shelby
B. Calambokidis, From Hospitals to Prisons: A New Explanation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 101,
103 (2017) (“A 2005 study found that 49.2% of inmates in state prisons reported symptoms of major
depressive disorder, mania disorder, or psychotic disorder.”). Additionally, “possession” of a firearm
has been interpreted broadly, so the waiving individual may not realize the full scope of potential
criminal liability. Following the states’ lead in allowing for only a waiver of purchase avoids these
problems. Alternatively, allowing an individual to select at sign up either purchase-only or
purchase-and-possession could help ensure that the waiver was knowing and informed.
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To facilitate the ability of people who currently possess firearms and want
to waive the right to purchase and possess, a state might mandate that its
police departments offer to take possession of the firearms for periods of
registration (and lay out safe harbors for transferring possession to third
parties, such as gun dealers, for storage).57 A more aggressive policy might
require registrants as part of registering to grant police permission to search
their belongings and confiscate any firearms.58 But such a provision would
likely deter many people from registering and accordingly is contraindicated.
Rescission. We also propose that individuals who waive be given the option
to rescind their waiver with the rescission automatically taking effect after
twenty-one days.59 Reasonable arguments might be made for making waiver
more durable. For example, the Wisconsin waiver bill makes waiver
nonrescindable for the first year after registration.60 Alternatively, a more
durable commitment might be accomplished by requiring some other
authority to approve before rescission takes effect. For example, the
California registry bill at one point required a court to determine by a
preponderance of the evidence that the registrant was not at an elevated risk
of suicide before granting rescission.61 To our minds, California might be
better served if it emulated the existing criteria for “relief from disability”
programs found in the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007.62 That
act makes a state eligible for federal grants if the state has created a
mechanism whereby people who have been involuntarily placed on the NICS
registry for being “formally adjudicated as . . . mental defective[s] or
committed involuntarily to a mental institution” can seek relief from the

57 Police departments perform an analogous function when they take temporary possession of
weapons when acting pursuant to a Gun Violence Restraining Order. See infra note 82.
58 Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Stop, Thief!, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/
0110/088.html [https://perma.cc/YS7H-J687]. (Jan. 10, 2005) (discussing a Combat Auto Theft bumper
sticker that grants police permission to stop the vehicle if found being driven between 1 am and 5 am).
59 See Vars, supra note 31, at 1469 (proposing a seven-day delay period), with Angela Selvaggio
& Fredrick E. Vars, “Bind Me More Tightly Still”: Voluntary Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 671, 673 (2016) (“A one-week delay, however, would not be enough to prevent all gun
suicide attempts.”); see also Selvaggio & Vars, supra, at 672 (arguing that more stringent judicial
hearing option is constitutional).
60 Assemb. B. 579 (Wisc. 2017). The bill also gives the would-be registrant the tripartite choice
of waiving for one, five, or twenty years. Id. As previously stated, we think consumers are more
likely to register with a simpler choice (of ongoing registration until opting to rescind).
61 Assemb. B. 1927 § 1 (Cal. 2018) (“A person registered on the California Do Not Sell List
may subsequently file a petition in the Superior Court of the county in which the person resides
requesting to have his or her name removed from the registry. The court, after a hearing, shall order
removal of the person’s name from the registry if he or she establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that he or she is not at elevated risk of suicide.”)
62 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub.L. No. 110–180, § 105, 122 Stat. 2559 (2008).
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status and have their names removed from the list.63 To qualify for removal,
the individual must be found not “likely to act in a manner dangerous to the
public safety,” and “granting of relief would not be contrary to the public
interest.”64 The Massachusetts registry bill adopts essentially these criteria.65
The Wisconsin registry, in contrast, makes mental health professionals the
gatekeepers with regard to registrant rescission. After Wisconsin’s year-long
irrevocable period, registrants may remove themselves from the database by
submitting to the Department of Justice a request for removal and an affidavit
from a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist saying that individual would not
pose a threat to themselves or others should they possess a firearm.66
More durable waivers that can only be removed after third-party (judicial
or psychiatric) assessment may be inimical to gun safety by dissuading some
individuals from waiving their gun rights in the first instance. Our own
survey evidence supports this possibility. Subjects who were given the option
of rescinding with an automatic seven-day waiting period were 6.7 percentage
points more likely to waive than subjects who were given the option of
rescinding only if they could convince a state judge that they were not a risk
to themselves or others. Moreover, we find below that subjects who had
previously been diagnosed with mental health issues were particularly less
likely to waive when only given the option of judicial rescission. Therefore, a
subgroup that may be more at risk is more unwilling to initially waive when
faced with the potential prospect of later establishing their mental capacity. Just
delaying the reacquisition of gun rights may prevent some suicides, as many
gun suicides are impulsive decisions completed with only a few minutes or
hours of thought.67 Studies have estimated that mandatory waiting periods
63 See Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
Certification of Qualifying State Relief from Disabilities Program (last visited Feb. 7, 2019)
https://www.atf.gov/file/11731/download [https://perma.cc/GV5S-EP9L]; see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11
(defining terms “[a]djudicated as a mental defective” and “committed to a mental institution”).
64 Bureau of Justice Statistics, The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=49 [https://perma.cc/WRX7-ZDQN ] (“As of December
2017, 31 states have enacted relief programs that have been certified by the state and approved by
ATF.”); see also Joseph R. Simpson & Kaushal K. Sharma: Firearms and the Mentally Ill:
Demographics and Psychiatric Characteristics of Individuals Petitioning for Early Relief from
Firearms Prohibition, Presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences (February 23, 2007) (“In some states, restoration of the right to possess firearms is
dependent on certification by a physician that the individual no longer presents a danger as a result
of mental illness.”).
65 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 36C(b); H.R. 3611 §3, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017).
66 Assemb. B. 579, 2017-2018 Leg. (Wis. 2017).
67 See Linda G. Peterson et al., Self-inflicted Gunshot Wounds: Lethality of Method Versus Intent, 142
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 228, 228-31 (1985) (finding that among thirty survivors of firearm suicide attempts
more than half had suicidal thoughts for less than a day); Megan Spokas et al., Characteristics of Individuals
Who Make Impulsive Suicide Attempts, 136 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 1121, 1122-23 (2012) (finding that
only 36.1% of people contemplated suicide for three or more hours before an attempt).
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have reduced suicide rates by as much as five percent.68 Many registrants who
rescind their waiver because they wish to kill themselves are unlikely to sustain
this desire over an enforced waiting period. Accordingly, we have opted here
for a less durable, but more transparently reversible rescission standard of a
twenty-one–day waiting period to maximize the chance of securing the initial
waiver. The Tennessee registry bill has adopted this three-week approach, while
the Washington bill mandates only one week before revocation is allowed.69
The diversity of approaches seen across the five registry bills regarding
waiver durability provides an encouraging example of federalism in action. The
differing choices of registry bills largely fall within the realm of plausibility as
legislators trade off the ex ante concern of registration incentives with the ex
post concern of (re)arming at-risk individuals. These variations are the
experiments emanating from the laboratory of democracy that may, if passed,
ultimately provide evidence to guide future registry design.
Our model statute also provides registrants the option of immediately
having their names removed from the NICS list if they can persuade a judge
that they are not a risk to themselves or others. This additional option for
immediate judicial bypass would protect registrants whose circumstances
change and might, for example, need a gun for self-defense. We also provide
registrants an affirmative defense against prosecution for purchase or
possession if the individual demonstrates necessity or self-defense. These
interventions would maintain the basic durability of a waiting period while
easing concerns that might prevent some from registering and allowing
registrants to protect themselves from later-arising threats.
Credible Communication. We propose that individuals who waive also be
given the option to credibly communicate their waiver to others. Accordingly,
our model statute calls for the registration platform to give waiving
individuals the option of providing email addresses of individuals at
institutions that they wish the platform to notify of their waiver. Without this
email option, waiving individuals could exercise their free-speech rights by
directly telling a third-party that they had waived their right to purchase and
possess guns, but the third-party would have trouble verifying whether such
waiver had actually taken place. With or without the registry option,
68 See Michael D. Anestis & Joye C. Anestis, Suicide Rates and State Laws Regulating Access and
Exposure to Handguns, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2049, 2049, 2051 (2015) (finding “significantly lower
firearm suicide rates” in states with a waiting periods for handgun purchases); Griffin Edwards et al.,
Looking Down the Barrel of a Loaded Gun: The Effect of Mandatory Handgun Purchase Delays on Homicide
and Suicide, 128 ECON. J. 3117, 3117 (2018) (“[T]he existence of a purchase delay reduces firearm-related
suicides by between 2% and 5% with no statistically significant increase in non-firearm suicides.”).
69 S.B. 5553 § 1, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); S.B. 0671 § 1(d), 109th Gen. Assemb.
(Tenn. 2017). Of course, this need not be an either-or decision. A statute could offer registrants two
options: (1) a delay option; or (2) a stickier option like a health care provider affidavit. In the interest
of keeping it simple, however, see sources cited supra note 48, we settle on the delay-only option.
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individuals are free to contractually promise not to possess firearms. But the
possibility of contract damages would often be an imperfect substitute for an
email from the registry confirming that gun dealers are incapacitated from
selling to the registrant and that the registrant has subjected herself to
potential criminal penalties for purchase or possession.70 While any
individual may claim (and even promise) to have waived, email notifications
from the government platform will more credibly indicate that he or she has
committed not to bear arms.
This communication option should be updatable across time in two ways.
First, if a waiving individual later rescinds her waiver, the platform should
automatically and immediately send emails to all previously designated addresses
indicating that such waiver is being rescinded in twenty-one days. Notice of
rescission will give recipients notice that the individual will soon regain the right
to bear arms and thus give recipients who were relying on the previous waiver the
ability to make different associational choices regarding the rescinding individual.
Notice of rescission would give recipients a chance to contact the individual and
perhaps prevent a suicide attempt or other tragic outcome. This notice of
rescission might be particularly valuable for healthcare professionals who,
especially with regard to patients who had previously engaged in suicidal ideation,
might inquire into the patient’s current mental health status.71
Second, the platform should allow waiving individuals to log on subsequent
to their initial waiver and provide additional email addresses to the platform.
The platform would immediately notify these additional addressees that the
individual had waived her right to bear arms (and also notify these addressees
if that individual subsequently initiated the process of rescinding her waiver).
The platform would not, however, allow an individual to log on and remove the
name of an addressee because such removal would undermine giving addressees
notice of possible subsequent rescission.

70 Existing casino self-exclusion programs also subject residents to potential penalties for
criminal trespass if they subsequently visit the casino. See, e.g., Missouri Gaming Commission,
Voluntary Exclusions Rules, 11 C.S.R. 45.17.010 (2017) (“Each person . . . on the List acknowledges
that it is his/her responsibility to refrain from visiting excursion gambling boats in Missouri and
that by being placed on the List s/he shall have a criminal complaint filed against him/her for
trespassing if s/he is discovered . . . .”); JOHN H. KLESCHINSKY ET AL., THE MISSOURI
VOLUNTARY EXCLUSION PROGRAM: PARTICIPANT EXPERIENCES ACROSS 10 YEARS 12 (Phase II
Report, Nov. 2008) (detailing the frequency of attempts to trespass after enrolling in the Missouri
gambling exclusion program and taking note that one participant was arrested while others received
a fine or citation).
71 Email addressees should also be notified should a registrant attempt to purchase a firearm
or be found with unauthorized possession of a firearm. Like rescission, an unauthorized attempt to
purchase or possess is an event which might trigger addressees to make different associational
choices or to inquire into the state of the registrant’s health.
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Part III below will defend the idea that email notifications from the
government can constitutionally facilitate an associational marketplace in
which economic actors with plausible self-defense interests might refuse to
deal with nonregistrants. Specifically, we imagine that landlords, fellow
residents and insurers might condition their willingness to economically
associate on receiving registry-confirming emails.72 And as just mentioned,
registrants might willingly provide the registry with the email addresses of
their psychiatrists and other mental health care professionals to enhance the
ability of these professionals to provide ongoing care.73
But as a political matter, the email option has been controversial. One
person’s informed association can be another person’s coercive discrimination.
Several of the registry bills to date forgo the email option altogether, and
outlaw any attempts to discriminate on registry status in contracting.74
However, Washington Senator Jamie Pedersen creatively forged an
alternative email option which reduces the potential for waiver discrimination
while retaining some of the core public health benefits. Pedersen’s registry
bill allows registrants to designate a third-party contact to be notified “if a
voluntary waiver of firearm rights is revoked.”75 The more-recently
introduced California bill analogously aimed to allow registrants to “list up
to five electronic mail addresses with the registry to be contacted promptly if
the person subsequently requests that his or her name be removed from the
registry.”76 By restricting registry notifications to the “back end” moment of
potential rescission, the Washington and California bills preclude economic
72 We also propose that email recipients be prohibited from sharing an individual’s waiver
status with others unless the addressee receives separate nonplatform authorization from the waiving
individual to share that information. But unlike the mandatory duty of confidentiality imposed on
gun dealers, see supra note 20, it is important that the duty of confidentiality be merely a default,
because we want to create an option for citizens who choose to make their waiver public. But to so
choose, a waiving individual would need to (i) register for the “No Guns” list, (ii) provide the email
address of a third party, and (iii) separately authorize that third party to publicly disclose that waiver
information. While cumbersome, we propose this pathway to publicity out of an abundance of
concern over waiver privacy.
73 Mental health professionals can play a crucial role in such interventions because a
substantial proportion of people who commit suicide have previously been under the care of a
mental health professional. Jason B. Luoma, et al., Contact with Mental Health and Primary Care
Providers Before Suicide: A Review of the Evidence, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 909, 912 (2002) (finding
that for individuals who had committed suicide, fifty-three percent had contact with mental health
professionals in their lifetime). But of course this means that roughly half have not been under the
care of a mental health professional.
74 H.R. 3611, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.B. 0671, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2017); Assemb.
B. 579, 2017-2018 Leg. (Wis. 2017).
75 S.B. 5553, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
76 Assemb. B. 1927 § 1 (Cal. 2018) (as introduced Jan. 24, 2018). The bill was later passed with
the language excluded. These versions can be compared at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billVersionsCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1927&cversion=20170AB192799INT
[https://perma.cc/U95P-X2Y7].
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and noneconomic actors from conditioning their association on the registry
verifying that a waiver is in effect. A Washington landlord might only want
to rent to tenants who have registered to waive their firearm rights, but in
Washington the landlord will only learn if a registrant attempts to rescind her
registration. “Back-end” notifications are still valuable because they can
provide friends, family and healthcare professionals with notice that this
person was once registered and will soon be capable of again purchasing
firearms. Recipients of these back-end notifications have the opportunity to
inquire and potentially intervene to save the registrant’s life.
Back-end notifications do not achieve all the benefits of our more fulsome
email notification proposal. Front-end notifications sent at the time of initial
registration are liberty enhancing options which not only foster informed
association, but allow others to better protect themselves. Reasonable parents
might, for example, prefer playdates for their children at homes with “no guns”
registrants and registration would allow healthcare professionals to ensure that
at-risk patients have taken action to reduce their access to firearms. Interim
notifications that a registrant has attempted illegally to purchase a firearm, like
back-end revocation notices, alert recipients that the registrant may be at risk.
Nonetheless, we take the Washington bill’s use of back-end notice to be a
humbling example of legislative creativity. After thinking and writing for years
about alternative implementations of our self-exclusion idea, we had never
considered the possibility of using an email option exclusively for back-end
revocations. The ability of Senator Pedersen to devise a plausible improvement
that had never occurred to us (or been mentioned at seminars on this Article
given at over a dozen universities) is a success story for federalism. Creative
state legislators confronting the necessity of forging a politically feasible
coalition have conjured not just different forms of email notification, but
different forms of durability and revocation. The state laboratory has succeeded
in drafting different experiments far beyond our expectation.
Third-party Waivers. It might seem obvious that the default meaning of an
individual’s inaction in any waiver scheme should be that the individual
retains her full Second Amendment rights. But here we consider two
situations where third-parties might be empowered to waive the Second
Amendment rights of certain classes of individuals, effectively, changing the
individual’s default legal treatment to waiver (with the possibility of
rescission twenty-one days after an affected individual moves to rescind his
or her waiver). First, we might imagine a regime in which the parents of a
minor would be empowered to waive on their child’s behalf.77 From the child’s
perspective, such a parent-initiated waiver would effectively change the
77 This is similar to, though of course not the same as, giving a newborn infant a lifetime NRA
membership. One of us has a relative who did exactly that.
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default. The child, upon turning eighteen, would have to affirmatively ask
that the parents’ waiver be rescinded and wait an additional twenty-one days
before being able to purchase a gun. Parental waiver would thus change the
minimum age of purchasing a gun from eighteen years to eighteen years and
twenty-one days. But the inertia created by the changed default (and the
twenty-one-day delay only starting after an affirmative request to rescind)
might still be sufficient, given the impulsive nature of many suicides, to
prevent some gun fatalities.
Second, we can also imagine a regime that would empower the police or
other state officials to change the default status of some individuals who have
displayed erratic behavior that falls short of necessitating involuntary
commitment, but which creates probable cause for the official to believe that
the individual is not well-suited to purchase or possess firearms. For example,
responding to a harassment call at a hotel, police documented Aaron Alexis’s
paranoid delusions, but did not arrest him or initiate involuntary
commitment proceedings.78 Less than six weeks later, Alexis legally
purchased a shotgun and used it to kill twelve people at the Navy Yard in
Washington, D.C.79 Again this third-party waiver would act only as a changed
default, because the affected individual would be free to immediately seek to
rescind the waiver and regain full Second Amendment rights after twentyone days.80 We envision a system where the public official could, after an
appropriate finding, place the affected individual on the “No Guns” registry
and have the state notified if the affected individual later moves to rescind the
waiver.81 So the government would learn of the individual’s attempt to acquire
weapons and have twenty-one days to investigate whether there would be an
independent basis for further action, such as potentially moving to have the
person involuntarily committed, and thereby establish a basis for keeping the
person on the NICS list notwithstanding his or her registry rescission. As
analogous Gun Violence Restraining Orders (GVROs) gain legislative

See Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2014).
See id.
This proposal has precedent. Under Indiana law, a police officer may seize firearms from an
individual if the police officer believes that person is “dangerous.” IND. CODE § 35-47-14-3 (2006).
Similarly, one of us has argued that people experiencing psychotic symptoms should lose their gun
rights. Vars, supra note 78.
81 In contrast, parents of individuals who have gained the age of majority should not by default
be given notice of any attempt by their child to rescind parental waiver.
78
79
80
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traction in many states,82 this kind of third-party waiver might prove to be
not only effective but also politically palatable.83
While we are attracted to these two classes of third-party waivers— especially
because they only amount to imposing a fairly short waiting period on an
affected individual’s right to acquire or own firearms—we have resisted the
temptation to deviate from the libertarian impulse animating our proposal
more generally. Since legislators might constitutionally impose a waiting period
on all gun purchases,84 it is likely that empowering parents and state officials
to impose waiting periods on subsets of individuals is likely to pass
constitutional muster. Subsequent legislatures might ultimately embrace thirdparty waiver, but we have opted for a more conservative, freedom-preserving

82 GVRO statutes allows third parties (including state officials) with documented evidence that
another person poses a serious threat to himself or herself or others to petition a court for an order
temporarily suspending the respondent’s possession of a firearm or ammunition. See, e.g., Jack Linshi,
California Law Allows Family Members to Remove Relative’s Guns for Safety, TIME (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://time.com/3450797/california-gun-violence-restraining-order-law [https://perma.cc/Z8FW-U4MH]
(“California residents can now petition a judge to temporarily remove a close relative’s firearms if
they fear their family member will commit gun violence . . . .”); see also Dan Friedman, The Gun
Law Saving Lives in Connecticut, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/09/new-gun-violence-bills/499199
[https://perma.cc/P95M-2TU6]
(mentioning ten states expected to consider GVRO legislation in 2017). Our registry proposal can
be seen as allowing a kind of GVRO self-petition–so that individuals could automatically obtain a
gun violence restraining order (GVRO) to limit their own ability to purchase or possess firearms by
filing a petition (i.e., registering) via the internet platform. An advantage of adding self-petition to
existing GVRO legislation is that GVROs often empower police to aid the restricted individuals in
dispossessing themselves of firearms. Id.
83 Allowing third-parties (including police and other state actors) to petition or negotiate for
self-exclusion of individuals who pose an imminent risk of injuring themselves or others can respond
to the problem of individuals who are not under the care of mental health professionals and
accordingly are less likely to be involuntarily committed:

An estimated nine percent of adults in the United States have problems with
impulsive, angry behavior and have access to firearms at home; these are individuals
who admit that they “break and smash things” when they get angry, and many of them
would meet diagnostic criteria for a mental health problem such as a personality
disorder. However, less than ten percent of these angry, impulsive, gun-possessing
adults have ever been hospitalized for a mental health problem, and thus would never
have lost their gun rights by dint of a mental-health-based restriction.
Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-based Gun Removal
Law: Does it Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 179, 184, (2017).
84 See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2016)(finding that a “10-day waiting period
is a reasonable safety precaution for all purchasers of firearms and need not be suspended once a
purchaser has been approved”).
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position.85 The Washington state bill passed with strong bipartisan support,86
which likely would not have been achievable if the measure had included thirdparty waiver. It is our hope that other states even more strongly protective of
gun rights will recognize that our purely voluntary approach does not infringe
one iota on lawful gun ownership.
II. WHO WOULD WAIVE
A. Theory
Giving citizens the option to waive their Second Amendment rights and to
communicate their waiver as a theoretical matter expands personal freedom.
Private contracting and promise do not allow individuals to as credibly commit
to nonownership or to communicate that status to others. An individual could
contractually promise not to purchase or possess guns, but that promise would
not subject gun dealers to liability for selling the individual a gun. While
breaching the promise would subject the promising individual to potential
contractual damages, it would not subject the promisor to criminal liability.87
Accordingly, learning that an individual had entered into a binding contract not
to purchase or possess firearms would not provide as much certainty as an email
from a government-sponsored registry that the person in question had opted into
potential criminal liability. This is not to say that the waiver registry would be
perfectly enforced, it is only to say that the registry option would increase the
choice set of Americans and hence expand their liberty.
There are many ways, however, that government might as a formal matter
expand our liberty. They might, for example, give us the freedom to subject
ourselves to criminal prosecution if we ever uttered the nonsense sentence
“An iron exposes her imagined customer.” But this technical expansion of our
liberty would have no practical value, because we cannot imagine why a
person would ever want to exercise this type of liberty.
The burden of this section, then, is to explain why the “No Guns” registry has
practical value; that is, why reasonable people would want to exercise the option to
waive their right to bear arms. (And the next section will provide empirical
evidence from surveys demonstrating that substantial numbers of Americans are
85 We would however allow governments to negotiate for waiver as part of a plea bargain with regard
to crimes that by themselves would not qualify the individual to be added to the registry (and governments
could revoke parole if the individual who accepted the deal later attempted to rescind their waiver).
86 See SB 5553 - 2017-19, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, http://apps2.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?
BillNumber=5553&Year=2017&BillNumber=5553&Year=2017 [https://perma.cc/G55x-7Y2F] (last
visited May 22, 2019) (detailing legislative history, including final vote tallies).
87 A rare, possible exception would be if a prosecutor could prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
promisor at the time of promising intended not to keep the promise. See generally IAN AYRES & GREG KLASS,
INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 170-193 (2005).
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in fact willing to waive this right.) As mentioned in the introduction, the demand
for waiver can be divided into three different components: (1) commitment, (2)
negotiated exclusion, and (3) political expression.
First and foremost, the waiver right can be seen as a commitment device
for those who rationally want to limit their future selves from misusing guns.
People who worry about loss of future control seek out a variety of disabling
devices—including bariatric surgery (which makes it painful to overeat) and
Antabuse (which makes it painful to drink alcohol).88 Users of the
commitment website, stickK.com, have voluntarily put more than
$35,000,000 at risk to increase the chance that their future selves follow
through with contractually set goals. States can and have played important
roles in providing citizens with commitment options. Several states have well
developed “no gambling” registries that block those who register from using
state casinos,89 and state recognition of marriage can be seen as enhancing
individual liberty by facilitating the ability of people to make more durable
relationship commitments.
Commitment devices are useful to people who have limited amounts of
willpower or self-control and are sufficiently self-aware to understand that
they have a problem.90 It is not our claim that everyone who rationally should
want to waive their right to bear arms would in fact avail themselves of a “No
Guns” registry. But of the hundreds of thousands of people in the United
States who suffer from serious mental illnesses, tens of thousands may
understand during moments of clarity that their future selves are at risk of
misusing firearms and be willing to take a government-sponsored opportunity
to limit their future, depressed or even psychotic, selves. The next section
will present survey evidence that such waiver demand is more pronounced
among people who have been previously diagnosed with mental illness. Many
people without mental illness are also at risk of suicide and, our data show,
many of them would also sign up.

88 See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 179 (1960) (explaining that the reason
for constitutions “is that all men in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt—or, because of the
limitation of their intellect, in fact bound—to violate rules of conduct which they would nevertheless
wish to see generally observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate
purposes will always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them”)
89 AYRES, supra note 12, at 143. One might imagine opening other government registries to voluntary
self-inclusion. For example, someone who felt they were at risk for committing sexual offenses might
voluntarily add their name to sex offender registries. While the stigma of current public registries suggests
that few would volunteer for such registration, one might imagine that some people would volunteer for
government GPS monitoring to credibly establish alibis against false claims.
90 See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 104
(1999) (distinguishing “naive” from “sophisticated” persons based on whether they are self-aware of
their self-control deficits).
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A second category of waiver demand can come from what we term
“negotiated exclusion.” Individuals may rationally commit to waive their
Second Amendment firearm rights in order to induce others to associate with
them. In particular, negotiated exclusion is made possible by the ability to
credibly communicate one’s waiver. Some friends, neighbors, and even loved
ones may be more willing to associate with individuals who credibly signal
that they have foregone the right to bear arms. The potential demand for
negotiated exclusion is suggested by analysis of Connecticut’s Gun Violence
Restraining Orders (GVROs), where roughly half of the petitions for gun
removal come from family and friends.91 Individuals who by themselves
would not be willing to self-exclude from gun ownership may voluntarily opt
to waive their firearm rights in order to secure or to continue particular
associational opportunities.
Our proposed registry enhances both self-commitment liberty (by letting
individuals bind their future selves) and market liberty (by letting individuals
better make commitments to others). Our proposal creates a marketplace of
informed association where one person’s right to bear arms has to contend,
potentially, with other people’s right to not associate. The “No Guns” registry
thus creates opportunities for a modern-day version of the central plot device
in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, in which some individuals are motivated to yield
their right to weapons because of threatened withholding of various forms of
interactions by friends and family.92 In September 2006, dozens of women
organized a sex strike in Pereira, Colombia, called La Huelga de las Piernas
Cruzadas (“the strike of crossed legs”) in an attempt to encourage gang
members to turn in their weapons.93 We are skeptical that mass refusals of
this kind could be effectively organized. But friends and family demanding
registration as a prerequisite for playdates and family visits is not far-fetched.
The demand for negotiated self-exclusion might also be prompted by the
threat of economic entities to withhold various forms of residential
association. Homeowners’ associations, coop boards and cotenants might
91 Rachel Sereix, Study Shows Connecticut Temporary Gun Removal Law Lowers Suicide Risk,
CHRONICLE (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2016/11/study-shows-connecticuttemporary-gun-removal-law-lowers-suicide-risk [https://perma.cc/63YF-EJ24] (stating that forty-nine
percent of “gun removal cases were initially reported to the police by an acquaintance”).
92 ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA (Jeffrey Henderson ed. & trans., Clarendon Press 1987)
(c. 411 B.C.E.) (telling the fictional story of Lysistrata, who persuades the women of Greece
to withhold sexual privileges from their husbands and lovers as a means of forcing the men to
end the Peloponnesian War).
93 See
Colombian Gangsters Face Sex Ban, BBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2006)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5341574.stm [https://perma.cc/2L4W-X3A5] (last visited 8/2/2016); see also
Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement In Domestic And International Law, 121
YALE L.J. 252, 258 (2011) (“[O]utcasting involves denying the disobedient the benefits of social
cooperation and membership.”).
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condition occupancy upon individuals’ waiver of their gun rights. Landlords
who at times attempt to collect late rent may prefer unarmed tenants.94
Our proposed associational marketplace might even exhibit some aspects
of a commodified marketplace. Some individuals might offer compensation
if others will sign the registry. Alternatively, a tenants’ association might
mandate a financial forfeiture or eviction if a resident rescinds a required
waiver.95 Life insurers or homeowners (or renter) insurers might give
discounts to individuals who credibly signaled that they had ceded the right
to bear arms. While many suicides are impulsive, there is also evidence that
insureds are more likely to attempt suicide once the initial period of payout
exclusion ends. Most states mandate that life insurance pay out when the
cause of death is suicide if the death occurs after the first year or two of the
policy.96 Samuel Hsin-yu Tseng found that the “suicide rate quadruples after
[this] exclusion period.”97 Life insurance companies, given the opportunity,
might offer discounts to insureds who had provided registry verification that
they had waived their right to own arms.98 Similarly, competition might
induce renter and homeowner insurance companies to offer discounts to
waiving individuals, as there is some evidence that gun ownership increases
the probability of burglary.99 As explained by Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig:
Guns in the home may pose a threat to burglars, but also serve as an
inducement, since guns are particularly valuable loot. Other things equal, a
gun-rich community provides more lucrative burglary opportunities than one
where guns are more sparse . . . . The new empirical results reported here
provide no support for a net deterrent effect from widespread gun ownership.
94 These actors might be motivated by any of a number of interests, including but not limited to
security concerns. See, e.g., Derrick Rose, Witness: Tenant Shot Landlord Through Window After Attempt to
Collect Rent, WHAS 11 ABC (June 28, 2016), http://www.whas11.com/news/crime/witness-tenant-shotlandlord-through-window-after-attempt-to-collect-rent/258300179, [https://perma.cc/N7RB-6N8N]
(reporting an incident in which a tenant allegedly shot and killed his landlord).
95 Such a private commitment contract could be created at the commitment contract website
StickK.com, co-founded by one of the authors. STICKK www.stickk.com [https://perma.cc/6SAJDWU8] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
96 See Samuel Hsin-yu Tseng, The Effect of Life Insurance Policy Provisions on Suicide Rates
2-4 (Dec. 15, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (stating that thirty-three states
permit a two-year suicide exclusion).
97 Id. at 2; see also Joe Chen, Yun Jeong Choi & Yasuyuki Sawada, Suicide and Life Insurance
3 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (using OECD cross-country data from 1980 to 2002 and finding
analogous exemption period effects).
98 Cf. Steven Yaccino, Schools Seeking to Arm Employees Hit Hurdle on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/schools-seeking-to-arm-employees-hithurdle-on-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/8R6V-MA2P] (higher insurance premiums deterred
some from allowing permit holders to bring guns onto public school property).
99 Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Effects of Gun Prevalence on Burglary: Deterrence vs
Inducement, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (Working Paper No. 8926, May 2002),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8926 [https://perma.cc/D9BD-H7CJ].

2019]

Gun (Self) Control

947

Indeed, our analysis concludes that residential burglary rates tend to increase
with community gun prevalence.100

While the incentive of individual insurance companies to provide waiver
discounts may be muted because reducing community gun prevalence lowers
the payouts of its rivals, a similar “lowering ‘rivals’ cost” effect has not stopped
individual insurers from offering LoJack discounts.101
This Article’s notion of gun control is “libertarian” not only in that it gives
the individual the enhanced rights to durably commit to not bear arms, but
also in that it gives others the liberty to condition their association on such
waiver. Of course, facilitating an associational market could, as an analytical
matter, lead to equilibrium with greater gun ownership. But the option to
condition association on gun ownership already exists and is easily verified.102
The email verification option as mentioned above just levels the evidentiary
playing field by allowing individuals to more feasibly condition association
on another person’s waiver. Thus, while particular actors may or may not
bring such pressure to bear,103 the email innovation on net should predictably
lead toward less gun ownership.
The set of economic entities that might make waiver a prerequisite for
contracting is potentially large and cut across many different consumer and
employment arenas. However, as described more in Part III, our proposal
would only allow economic entities with residential or insurance self-defense
interests to condition willingness to contract on waiver. Employers, for
example, have a substantial interest in preventing their employees from
bringing guns to the job site and killing themselves or others. There have
been numerous instances of employee-instigated workplace violence,
including the 2016 San Bernardino shootings, where an employee and his wife
killed fourteen others at a workplace holiday party.104 One federal investigator
said the leading theory for motive was a “combination of terrorism and
workplace” conflict.105 And while mass shootings in the workplace are

Id. at 4.
See Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim
Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of LoJack, 113 Q. J. ECON. 43, 73 (1998) (stating that insurance
companies continue to offer LoJack discounts even in states where no discount is mandated by law).
102 See Blocher, supra note 5, at 4 (“[T]he Second Amendment’s guarantee of an individual right
to keep or bear arms in self-defense should include the freedom not to keep or bear them at all.”).
103 For example, if people with a higher risk of suicide are more likely to register, life insurers
may not be economically motivated to give discounts for registering. But insurers would not be
likely to increase the price to registrants because registrants would then not opt to disclose that
information (via the registry email) to the insurer.
104 See James Queally et al., Motive for Killings a Mystery—Some Think Mix of Work Issues,
Extremism Led to Calif. Attack, CHI. TRIB. Dec. 4, 2015, at 1.
105 See id. at 2.
100
101
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unusual,106 attacks involving fewer than four victims are quite common,
resulting in 14,770 total workplace homicide victims between 1992 and 2012.107
But in an abundance of caution, we do not propose authorizing employers to
discriminate on the basis of gun waiver.108
A third, and final, category of waiver demand might derive from what we
term “political expression.” Some people might choose to both waive and
credibly communicate their waiver to signal to fellow citizens and to
representatives the registrants’ support of legislative action to limit gun
violence. After a mass shooting, such as the 2016 Orlando attack at a gay
nightclub in which forty-nine people were killed, many people experience a need
to do something.109 Purchases of guns generally, and assault rifles in particular,
tend to spike after mass shootings.110 However, other Americans might instead
choose to take action to credibly signal that they are not armed. For example,
when registering, an individual might simultaneously have the platform send
evidence of their waiver to a “Stop Handgun Violence” organization.111
Of course, some people will be reluctant to have their identity as registrants
publicly known for fear that they may become targets of home invasions and
other crime, as criminals will be able to ascertain that they are not armed.
However, even people who choose not to provide any email addresses might
still be motivated to waive in order to signal their commitment to reducing
firearm prevalence. This is because the platform would disclose the aggregate
number of people who have volunteered to add their names to the registry.
Indeed, this aggregate registry disclosure by category is already done. For
106 They account for just four percent of mass shootings. Analysis of Recent Mass Shootings,
E VERYTOWN FOR G UN S AFETY (Apr. 11, 2017), https://everytownresearch.org/reports/massshootings-analysis [https://perma.cc/GW5X-LPKR].
107 Occupational Violence, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
topics/violence (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter CDC].
108 We also would prohibit government from purchasing waiver–for example, by requiring
waiver as a prerequisite of a gun buyback program–because government purchasing might
constitute and unconstitutional condition. Richard Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1988) (arguing that there are
occasions for which “receipt of a benefit to which someone has no constitutional entitlement does
not justify” abandoning “rights guaranteed under the Constitution”). However, as argued above,
we would allow conditioning plea bargaining (with its independent requirement of wrong doing)
upon waiver. See supra note 85, at 184.
109 For example, a petition to enact stricter weapon legislation in Orlando garnered 41,618
signatures. Adam Hartnett, Enact Stricter Weapon Legislation in the City of Orlando, CHANGE.ORG,
https://www.change.org/p/mayor-buddy-dyer-enact-stricter-weapon-legislation-in-the-city-of-orlando-2?
source_location=topic_page [https://perma.cc/G39D-UBFX] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
110 Lacey N. Wallace, Responding to Violence with Guns: Mass Shootings and Gun Acquisition,
52 SOC. S CI. J. 156 (2015); Zachary Crockett, What Happens After a Mass Shooting? Americans
Buy More Guns, V OX (June 15, 2016, 11:00 A.M.), http://www.vox.com/2016/6/15/11936494/
after-mass-shooting-americans-buy-more-guns [https://perma.cc/8Z4T-MMMF].
111 See supra notes 11 and 20 and accompanying text (describing mechanisms of separately
authorizing use of one’s name as evidence of waiver).
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example, the FBI reported as of 2017 not just the total number of registrants
(17,399,461), but also the number of individuals prohibited from purchasing or
possessing guns for particular reasons.
Figure 1: Total Active Records in the NICS Index
TOTAL ACTIVE RECORDS: 17,399,461

7,352,511

Illegal/Unlawful Alien
Adjudicated Mental Health

5,169,853

Convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year
or a misdemeanor punishable by more than two years

3,412,057
1,049,355

State Prohibitor
Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence Conviction

155,829

Under Indictment/Information

103,042

Protection/Restraining Order for Domestic Violence

67,770

Renounced U.S. Citizenship

42,693

Unlawful User/Addicted to a Controlled Substance

29,909

Dishonorable Discharge

15,583

Fugitive from Justice

859

All that would be required under our proposal would be to add an
additional category of “Voluntary Registrants.”112
The “No Guns” list could thus become a particularly powerful way to
publicly show support by signaling the number of people who are willing to
waive their Second Amendment rights. The next section shows that close to
a third of our survey respondents indicate that they would be willing to add
their name to their state’s “No Gun” list. While some of these respondents
are waiving as a self-exclusion/commitment strategy, others are likely waiving
as a (small) way to take expressive action against gun violence.

112 See F.B.I., supra note 9, at 27. As described below, if implemented through our model state
statute, “voluntary registrants” would be a subcategory of “state prohibitor,” the category created by
disqualifying attributes defined by individual states. Our model statute would make people who had
voluntarily registered an additional disqualifying category.
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B. Empiricism
This Section goes beyond merely theorizing about potential demand and
instead provides initial “proof of concept” evidence that a substantial minority
of Americans are in fact willing to waive their Second Amendment rights. As
an initial matter, most Americans do not currently own weapons.113 The exact
percentage owning guns is difficult to ascertain, but surveys suggest that the
proportion could be as low as just one third and it has been declining in recent
decades.114 For example, Figure 1 shows that the proportion of people saying
they had guns or revolvers in their home dropped from 49% in 1973 to just 34%
in 2010.115
Figure 2: U.S. Gun Ownership Percentage Over Time

60%
50%

49 %

40%

34%
28%

30%

22%

20%
10%

Do you happen to
have in your home
(or garage) any
guns or revolvers?
Do any of these
guns personally
belong to you?

0%
19 70

19 80

19 9 0

2000

2010

Moreover, the Figure shows that the proportion of Americans who
personally owned guns in 2010 was, in this University of Chicago survey,
just 22%. Accordingly, the registry is asking citizens to waive a right that
most are not exercising.
This Section will be reporting survey results that more than thirty percent
of respondents are willing to waive their gun rights. But this survey evidence

113 Kim Parker et al., America’s Complex Relationship with Guns, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June
22, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/americas-complex-relationship-with-guns/
[https://perma.cc/8DCB-SYVM] (reporting that thirty percent of Americans own firearms).
114 See Drew DeSilver, A Minority of Americans Own Guns, but Just How Many Is Unclear, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER 1 (June 4, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/04/a-minorityof-americans-own-guns-but-just-how-many-is-unclear [https://perma.cc/7TNS-WKAD] (“37%,
more than a third of Americans say they or someone in their household owns a gun.”).
115 Id. at 1-2.
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is likely conservative for two reasons.116 First, the survey focuses primarily on
the potential “self-exclusion” demand for waiver. Because the survey’s
description of registration excluded the possibility of credible communication
to third parties, we have not measured the derived demand of “negotiated
exclusion”, where third parties (friends, family, neighbors, cotenants and
insurers) may incentivize waiver by limiting their willingness to associate with
nonwaivers. Something as simple as a fifty-dollar annual discount for
homeowners or life insurance might be sufficient to dramatically increase the
demand for waiver. Second, the willingness-to-waive estimates are conservative
because they were elicited without any prior government or private messaging.
Public service announcements and other forms of advertisements might
increase the salience of the question and the palatability of waiver itself.117 Of
course, advertisements can also be utilized by those trying to discourage waiver.
But our finding below that people are more willing to waive when informed
that their peers are waiving is at least suggestive that more publicity and
deliberation might produce on net even higher waiver rates than reported here.
And information provided by an individual’s health care provider may be more
persuasive than any public information campaign.
C. MTurk Survey
1,050 Mechanical Turk respondents completed an online survey on a
Thursday, March 3, 2016. The major caveat in using the MTurk worker
population as survey respondents is its limited representativeness, raising
questions about external validity. While restricted to the United States, the
MTurk worker population is not representative of Americans at large.118
116 Our empiricism, however, does not directly test how people would respond to our proposed
twenty-one day waiting period, which as described above was chosen as a compromise between the
less durable seven-day waiting period and the more durable state judge options that we test below.
Note additionally that there is some evidence that there is often poor take up of advance directives,
especially amongst people with mental illness. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Psychiatric Advance
Directives and Reduction of Coercive Crisis Interventions, 17 J. MENTAL HEALTH 255, 259-63 (2008)
(discussing a study in which 70% of individuals state that they wish to have an advanced directive
but only 30% of individuals follow through); see also Eric B. Elbogen et al., Effectively Implementing
Psychiatric Advance Directives to Promote Self-Determination of Treatment Among People with Mental
Illness, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 273, 286 (2007).
117 See, e.g., Sarah Durkin, Emily Brennan & Melanie Wakefield, Mass Media Campaigns to
Promote Smoking Cessation Among Adults: An Integrative Review, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 127 (2012).
118 Berinsky and others argue that MTurk workers are more representative than “convenience
samples,” but less so than expensive representative samples like the Current Population Survey. See
Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor Markets for
Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 355-61 (2012). Huff and
Tingley extend this analysis. See Connor Huff & Dustin Tingley, “Who Are These People?” Evaluating
the Demographic Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey Respondents, RES. & POL.,
July-Sept. 2015, at 1, 7-8 (2015).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Current Population Survey (July 2015) and
MTurk Sample119
Variable
Gender: Male
Gender: Female
Gender: Other
Region: West
Region: South
Region: Midwest
Region: Northeast
Race: Asian
Race: Black
Race: Hispanic
Race: White
Race: Mixed Race
Race: Other
Age: 18-24
Age: 25-34
Age: 35-44
Age: 45-54
Age: 55-64
Age: 65+
Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual
Sexual Orientation: Homosexual
Sexual Orientation: Bisexual
Sexual Orientation: Other
Income: $25,000 or less
Income: $25,000-$49 ,9 9 9
Income: $50,000-$74,9 9 9
Income: $75,000-$9 9 ,9 9 9
Income: $100,000-$149 ,9 9 9
Income: $150,000 or more
Marital Status: Single
Marital Status: Married
Marital Status:
Divorced/Separated/Widowed
Education: Less Than High School
Education: High School
Education: Associates Degree

U.S. Adults Over Age 18
- CPS (July 2015)
0.48
0.52
0.23
0.37
0.21
0.18
0.06
0.12
0.15
0.65
0.01
0.01
0.11
0.18
0.17
0.18
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.25
0.19
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.27
0.54

MTurk
Sample
0.63
0.37
0.00
0.24
0.35
0.22
0.19
0.08
0.05
0.06
0.79
0.02
0.00
0.16
0.49
0.21
0.08
0.05
0.01
0.9 1
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.19
0.31
0.24
0.13
0.10
0.03
0.58
0.36

0.19
0.11
0.49
0.10

0.06
0.00
0.29
0.17

119 Only those eighteen and older were allowed to take the MTurk survey, though ages were
self-reported. Current Population Survey (CPS) data from July 2015.
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Education: Bachelors Degree
Education: Graduate Degree
Political Party: Democrat
Political Party: Republican
Political Party: Independent
Political Party: Not Registered
Voted in 2012: Obama
Voted in 2012: Romney
Voted in 2012: Other
Voted in 2012: None
Uses the Internet
N

0.20
0.11
0.76
-

0.42
0.11
0.45
0.18
0.32
0.05
0.56
0.18
0.07
0.18
1,050

Our sample is 63% male and is younger than average. 65% of the sample
is between 18 and 34 years old, compared to 29% in the United States as a
whole. The sample is more highly educated and more likely to be single. The
sample is also much more liberal than the United States as a whole. Nearly
60% voted for Obama in 2012, and less than 20% voted for Romney, though
in reality the voter split was 51% to 47%. 45% in the sample were registered
Democrats and only 18% were registered Republicans. Nearly 80% were
white, compared to 65% nationwide.120 We attempt to account for some of
these disparities by estimating weighted averages that give heightened weight
to the responses from relatively underrepresented respondent demographic
groups.121
Method. Respondents were randomized into eight groups defined by three
pairs of treatments (2 x 2 x 2 = 8). The first treatment pair is “purchase” versus
“possess or purchase,” referring to the banned activities for individuals whose
names are on the list. Respondents assigned to the “possess or purchase”
group were shown following vignette:
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System maintains a “No
Guns” list which prevents certain individuals (for example, convicted felons)
from possessing firearms and from purchasing firearms from gun dealers.
Imagine that your state legislature has just enacted a new program that gives
state residents the right to confidentially add their names to this “No Guns”
list.” Proponents of the legislation have argued that restricting access to
firearms reduces suicides, homicides, and accidental deaths.

Respondents assigned to the “purchase” group were shown a vignette that
omits the “from possessing firearms” language, but is otherwise the same.
120 See Ian Ayres & Fred Vars, Online Appendix, YALE U., at 2 tbl.1 (Aug. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Online
Appendix], https://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/2016_08_08%20Online%20Appendix.pdf .
121 See supra note 85.

954

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 921

The second arm of the experiment randomly assigned respondents into
“wait seven days” or “state judge” groups, referring to the manner in which
an individual can remove their name from the list. The second pair of
treatments states either:
“If you add your name, you can later remove it for any reason by requesting
removal and waiting seven days” or
“If you add your name, you can later remove it if a state judge certifies that
you are not a danger to yourself or others.”

The third arm of the experiment randomly assigned respondents into “simple
ask” v. “more than half ” groups, referring to the way respondents were asked
about their willingness to register. The third pair of treatments states either:
“Would you be willing to add your name to your state’s ‘No Guns’ list?” or
“Would you be willing to add your name to your state’s ‘No Guns’ list if more
than half of other adults in your state also add their names?”

A respondent was randomly assigned to each of the three arms, for a total
of 8 (2 x 2 x 2) group combinations. A combination might be, for example,
“purchase and possess,” “state judge” and “simple ask.”122
Results. The eight treatment groups were properly balanced on
pretreatment
demographic
characteristics—suggesting
that
the
randomization successfully assigned similar respondents to the different
groups.123 For our central outcome variable, we find across all vignette types
that 30.8% (95% confidence interval: 28.0% to 33.6%) of our 1,050 MTurk
subjects responded that they would be willing to add their names to their
state’s “No Guns” list.124 Nearly a third of respondents expressed a
willingness to waive some form of their Second Amendment rights.
The treatment effects for our three experimental arms can be seen in
Figure 3:
122 See Online Appendix, supra note 120, at 6-9 figs. 1-8, for screenshots of all eight groups.
The underlying data and statistical analysis (including STATA .do and output files) can be found at
https://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/nogunsdata.zip.
123 See id. tbl.2.
124 Using the Current Population Survey data, we apply post-stratification weights to the
sample based on gender, age group, and region. After reweighting the data to match the CPS data,
the percent responding positively dropped slightly to 29.6% (95% confidence interval: 24.0% to
35.1%). There are several drawbacks to this methodology. First, we are forced to place very high
weight on people aged over 35 because of their underrepresentation in the data. This introduces
volatility (as shown by a large increase in the size of the confidence interval), and places a large
emphasis on a relatively small number of respondents. The post-stratification weight, for example,
averages 15 for those over 65 and 18 for women over 65. Second, we make the assumption that
internet-using citizens (who are able to respond to the survey) would have the same view, on average,
as non-Internet-using citizens.
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Figure 3: Percent of Respondents Adding Name to “No Guns” List, by
Treatment Group125
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The left-hand columns of Figure 3 show that subjects’ willingness to waive
was not reduced by increasing the scope of the waiver to include purchase and
possession. 31.0% of subjects were willing to add their name to a “No Guns”
list which would prohibit them from purchasing weapons, while 30.6% of
subjects were willing to add their names to a “No Guns” list which would
prohibit both the purchase and the possession of guns. As discussed above,
the equal willingness to waive across this dimension suggests that structuring
choice to include purchase and possession might not dissuade registration.
In contrast, both the rescission and peer arms of the test displayed
statistically significant treatment effects. Subjects who were told they could
automatically rescind their waiver after seven days were 6.7 percentage points
more likely to waive than those who were told that they could only rescind
their waiver if a state judge found that they were not a risk to themselves or
others (34.1% vs. 27.4%). As shown in the right-hand columns of Figure 3,
subjects were 9.2 percentage points more likely to waive if more than half of
other adults in their state also added their names than if the choices of others
were not mentioned (35.4% vs. 26.2%).
We also found substantially different willingness to participate for
different types of respondents. Subjects who reported having been previously
125 The dashed line represents the average response waiver rate (30.8%) across all subjects.
N = 1050.

956

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 921

“diagnosed with a mental disorder” (15.1% of the sample) or having “regular
access to firearms at home” (24.3% of the sample) displayed highly variable
willingness to participate.
Figure 4: Percent of Respondents Adding Name to “No Guns” List, by
Mental Disorder Diagnosis and Access to Firearms126
60%

Percent of Respondents

50%
40%
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0%
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Access (669
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Respondents)

As shown in Figure 3, those with no mental health diagnosis and no access
to a firearm are close to the sample mean at 33.2%. Subjects with regular
access to firearms are (unsurprisingly) less likely to waive their Second
Amendment rights: those with “regular access to firearm at home” are 15.6
percentage points less likely to waive. However, respondents with a diagnosed
mental disorder are 9.7% more likely to waive their rights. Those who have a
diagnosed mental disorder and access to a gun are 8.9% less likely to waive
their rights, but the small number of respondents in this category causes the
estimate to be imprecise.
Table 2 shows the results of OLS regressions where a dummy for
willingness to register is regressed on indicator variables for each of the 3
experimental arms, as well as several respondent (self-reported)
characteristics. Model 1 parallels the histogram above (Figure 2) with controls
testing whether the “possess or purchase,” the “stage judge,” or the “more than
half ” groups are statistically different than their paired counterparts. Model
2 adds a dummy for whether or not the respondents scored at or above a 7 on
126

The dashed line represents the average response rate across all subjects. N = 1050.
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the Suicide Behaviors Questionnaire-Revised (SBQ-R), a cutoff that has
been shown to indicate being at risk of suicide.127 Model 3 adds a dummy for
whether the respondent self-reports as having been diagnosed with a mental
disorder. Model 4 adds interactions with the random treatments. Model 5
adds a dummy indicating whether the respondent has regular access to a
firearm, as well as an interaction with the mental disorder dummy. This
parallels Figure 3. Model 6 adds dummies indicating if there are children in
the home. Model 7 adds more than a dozen demographic controls for
respondents’ race, gender, sexual orientation, age, region, income, education,
and political identification.128
Table 2: Regression Results
Possess or Purchase
State Judge
More Than Half of
Other Adults
SBQ-R Score Greater
Than or Equal to 7
Diagnosed with a Mental
Disorder
Diagnosed with a Mental
Disorder X Possess or
Purchase
Diagnosed with a Mental
Disorder X State Judge
Diagnosed with a Mental
Disorder X More Than
Half
Have Regular Access to
Firearm
Diagnosed with a Mental
Disorder X Regular
Access to Firearm
Live with Children
Under 18
Live with Children
Under 5
Full Demographic
Controls
Constant
Observations
R-squared

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

-0.005
(0.028)
-0.066**
(0.028)
0.09 2***
(0.028)

-0.004
(0.028)
-0.065**
(0.028)
0.09 1***
(0.028)
0.054
(0.035)

-0.003
(0.028)
-0.066**
(0.028)
0.087***
(0.028)

-0.016
(0.030)
-0.041
(0.030)
0.09 8***
(0.031)

-0.006
(0.028)
-0.065**
(0.028)
0.086***
(0.028)

-0.005
(0.028)
-0.064**
(0.028)
0.088***
(0.028)

0.001
(0.028)
-0.057**
(0.028)
0.085***
(0.028)

0.087**
(0.042)

0.142*
(0.079 )

0.089 *
(0.047)

0.084**
(0.041)

0.077*
(0.041)

-0.154***
(0.031)

-0.165***
(0.030)

-0.109 ***
(0.032)

0.058
(0.041)
-0.025
(0.050)

0.057
(0.045)
-0.027
(0.052)

NO
0.312***
(0.032)
1,050
0.044

YES
0.336***
(0.069 )
1,050
0.105

0.103
(0.082)
-0.166**
(0.083)
-0.037
(0.084)

-0.038
(0.09 3)

NO
0.029 8***
(0.028)
1,050
0.015

NO
0.285***
(0.029 )
1,050
0.017

NO
0.285***
(0.029 )
1,050
0.020

NO
0.274***
(0.031)
1,050
0.025

NO
0.326***
(0.031)
1,050
0.042

127 See Augustine Osman et al., The Suicide Behaviors Questionnaire-Revised (SBQ-R), 8
ASSESSMENT 443, 452 (2001).
128 The full regression and list of demographic controls is reported in Online Appendix Table 2.
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Model 1 shows the magnitude and statistical significance of the differences
shown in Figure 2. Requiring a state judge to certify that you are not a danger
to yourself or to others, rather than requesting removal and waiting seven
days, lowers support by 6.6 percentage points and is statistically significant
(p. < .05). Conditioning sign up on more than half of other adults in the state
signing up statistically increases support by 9.2 percentage points, as
compared to simply asking if the respondent would like to sign up. But as
suggested by Figure 2, there is no statistical difference in support whether
the scope of waiver is framed as “purchase or possess” or merely “purchase.”
Model 2 tests whether having an SBQ-R score above 7 affects sign up, and
finds that it does by 5.4 percentage points, but this result is not statistically
significant. However, Model 3 suggests that having been diagnosed with a
mental disorder in the past is associated with increased support by 8.7
percentage points and is statistically significant (p. < .05). Model 4 interacts
the mental disorder dummy with the three treatment dummy variables. Most
notably, the coefficient on “Diagnosed with a Mental Disorder X State Judge”
is large, negative, and statistically significant (p. < .05). This indicates that
those who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder are 16.6 percentage
points less likely to sign up if required to convince a state judge that they are
not a danger to themselves or others (as opposed to simply requesting to take
their name off and waiting seven days). Concomitant with this effect is the
lack of statistical significance on the uninteracted “State Judge” variable,
indicating that those who have not been diagnosed with mental disorders are,
statistically, equally willing to add their names even if they must go before a
state judge to have it later removed.
Model 5 indicates that those with regular access to a firearm are less
willing to voluntarily give up their Second Amendment rights by 15.4
percentage points. This effect is stable for those who have been diagnosed
with a mental disorder. Model 6 shows that support does not seem to be
affected by the presence of children in the household.
Model 7 adds full demographic controls to Model 6 (see Online Appendix
Table 3 for full results). Women are 8.4 percentage points more likely to sign up
than men. Asian, Black, and Hispanic respondents were all more than 10
percentage points more likely to sign up than White respondents (11.9, 15.9, and
19.7 percentage points, respectively). Registered Democrats were also
statistically much more likely to be willing to waive their Second Amendment
rights than Republicans, independents, and those who are not registered to vote.
D. The Alabama Survey
The high sign-up rates reported above for those diagnosed with a mental
disorder (42.9%) are consistent with an independent study assessing the
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willingness of individuals to self-restrict firearms.129 In an anonymous survey
administered at an inpatient psychiatric unit and two outpatient psychiatric
clinics at an academic medical center, 46% of 200 psychiatric patients in
Alabama said they would volunteer for either the seven-day or judicialhearing versions of the proposal.130
A similar proportion (39%) of MTurk respondents who reported being
diagnosed with a mental health disorder were willing to self-restrict—even
though there were important differences in the subject population and survey
methodology. The offline Alabama survey offered a much more extensive
rationale for the proposals than did the MTurk survey. Alabama has the
seventh highest gun ownership rate in the United States131 and a strong
consensus against gun regulation,132 and a slightly higher proportion of
Alabama respondents relative to MTurk respondents reported access to
firearms (26% vs. 24%),133 so the sign-up rate might be higher in other states
with lower rates of gun ownership and less resistance to gun regulation.
The MTurk survey also confirmed several other secondary findings from
the Alabama study. Those with current access to a gun were significantly less
likely to volunteer (though 18.7% still did).134 Whites were less likely to sign
up for the judicial hearing option in the earlier study, which was also
consistent with the MTurk results.135 The SBQ-R score was not significantly
associated with sign-up rates in either study. And the presence of children in
the home had no statistically meaningful effect.136
E. Estimated Lives Saved
The substantial sign-up rates found in both the Alabama and MTurk
surveys suggest that the proposal could save hundreds of lives each year. In
2013, there were 23,088 suicides in states without waiting periods.137 In the
MTurk survey, a little over 31% indicated they would sign up for the proposal
129 See Fredrick E. Vars et al., Willingness of Mentally Ill Individuals to Sign Up for a Novel Proposal
To Prevent Firearm Suicide, 47 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 483, 483 (2017).
130 Id.
131 See Bindu Kalesan, Marcos D Villarreal, Katherine M. Keyes & Sandro Galea, Gun
Ownership and Social Gun Culture, 22 INJURY PREVENTION 216, 218 (2015).
132 See Fredrick E. Vars, Shooting Blanks: Alabama’s New Gun Rights Amendment, JURIST (Nov. 21, 2014),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2014/11/fredrick-vars-alabama-gun/ [https://perma.cc/N5FH-2T2G].
133 See Vars, supra note 122, at 485.
134 Id. at 487-488.
135 Id. at 487.
136 Id.
137 See Griffin Edwards et al., supra note 68, at 6-7 tbl.1 (2018); C HRISTOPHER W.
DRAPEAU & JOHN L. MCINTOSH, U.S.A. SUICIDE: 2013 OFFICIAL FINAL DATA, AM. ASS’N
OF SUICIDOLOGY (2015), http://www.suicidology.org/Portals/14/docs/Resources/FactSheets/
2013datapgsv3.pdf [https://perma.cc/62V6-WRM8] (reporting C.D.C. data).
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with the seven-day delay removal option.138 It is unreasonable to think that a
31% waiver rate would translate into a 31% reduction in suicides. Some
individuals who waive would access guns by waiting or from other sources.139
Others would kill themselves by other means. However, a large and
sophisticated study found a 2%–5% reduction in suicide for handgun purchase
waiting periods seven days or longer.140 If we assume a 5% reduction in suicide
of those who sign up, our proposal could be expected to save approximately
370 lives.141 At the government’s statistical value of human life, this amounts
in economic terms to an annual benefit of more than $3 billion—far
outstripping the modest and largely one-time costs of creating the registry
platform as a modest addition to the FBI’s existing program.142
Moreover, as mentioned above, there are good reasons to expect this
estimate of lives saved to be a lower bound. It assumes that a 31% registration
rate and a 5% decline in suicide rate for registrants in states without waiting
periods. But both these assumptions are likely conservative. Negotiated
exclusion could substantially increase the population proportion that
registers. And those who register may experience more than a 5% decline in
suicide both because our surveys suggest that those more at risk are more
likely to register, and because those registrants providing emails may trigger
productive third-party interventions if registrants later attempt to rescind
their waiver.143 All things considered, one could easily imagine the system
saving one or two thousand lives a year.
III. LIBERTARIAN CONTRACTING AND ITS LIMITS
While giving individuals the unfettered, unilateral discretion to waive
their right to bear arms is consonant with the libertarian embrace of self-

See supra fig.2.
See Jeffrey W. Swanson, et. al, Gun Violence, Mental Illness, And Laws That Prohibit Gun
Possession: Evidence From Two Florida Counties, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1067, 1067 (2016) (“28 percent of
gun suicides involved individuals not legally permitted to have a gun at the time.”).
140 See Griffin Edwards et al., supra note 68, at 1, 1.
141 23,845 x 0.308 x 0.05 = 367.2
142 367.2 * $9,100,000 = $3,341,520,000. See Binyamin Appelbaum, As U.S. Agencies Put More Value on
a Life, Businesses Fret, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/
economy/17regulation.html [https://perma.cc/75PQ-H2AF] (reporting that the EPA set the value of a
human life at $9.1 million).
143 The powerful potential effect of gun removal on suicide is underscored by a recent analysis
of Connecticut’s Gun Violence Restraining Orders (GVROs), which allow third-party petitions for
gun removal where person poses risk of “imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other
individuals.” Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based
Gun Removal Law: Does it Prevent Suicides?, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 180, 203 (2017)
(estimating “approximately one averted suicide for every ten to eleven gun seizure cases”).
138
139
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authorship,144 the negotiated-exclusion aspect of our proposal created by the
email option raises separate concerns about government’s burdening of
individuals’ Second Amendment rights. From one perspective, negotiated
exclusion where waiver is induced by the threat of private third parties to
withhold commercial or noncommercial association does not raise
constitutional concerns because it does not involve any state action. But the
email option does involve the government as a facilitator. The government
facilitates the associational marketplace by credibly communicating waiver
information (if so directed by the registrant) to third parties.
If a state created a similar registry that gave women the option to have the
state credibly communicate to third parties whether or not they have had an
abortion, merely facilitating an associational marketplace would raise concerns
about whether the government’s facilitating role would constitute an “undue
burden” on the exercise of this fundamental right.145 On the other hand, a
government registry that gave registered voters the option of credibly
communicating whether or not they exercised their right to vote would almost
certainly be constitutional. This would just be an “I voted” sticker on steroids.
Indeed many state governments, without constitutional challenge, already do
more than merely give citizens the option of communicating this to others; many
states publicize whether specific citizens voted or not in specific elections.146 The
constitutional jurisprudence of whether government can compel disclosure of
whether individuals exercise constitutional rights is not well specified, with
mandated disclosure of voting allowed, but with mandated disclosure of
associational membership, in cases like NAACP v. Alabama,147 prohibited.
But our email option does not concern a government-compelled
disclosure. Instead the email option merely involves the government giving
private individuals the option of having their registration verified to third
parties chosen by the individual. The constitutionality of government merely
giving the individual the option of having government disclose the exercise
of a constitutional right of has never been addressed (to our knowledge) by a
court. The government act of literally sending the email does constitute a
kind of state action. The government’s action verifies that an individual has
registered (or is revoking their registration) and may give particular salience
144 The constitutionality of self-exclusion with regard to Second Amendment rights has separately been
analyzed. Blocher, supra note 5, at 4-5; Selvaggio & Vars, supra note 59; Vars, supra note 31.
145 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (stating that state restriction is
an undue burden if it has “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”).
146 See Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green & Christopher W. Larimer, Social Pressure and Voter
Turnout: Evidence from a Largescale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 33 (2008).
147 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963) (striking down a Virginia statute requiring membership list disclosure).
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to this piece of information. The mere fact that the government’s action is
triggered by, and contingent on, a private option does not immunize the state
action from constitutional scrutiny.
Imagine, for example, that the state of Louisiana gave candidates the
option of having their race listed on election ballots and the state did this for
the purpose of facilitating private discrimination against African-American
candidates. In 1964, the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Martin struck down an
analogous Louisiana statute which compelled the designation of candidate
race on ballots.148 The Court reasoned that “by directing the citizen’s
attention to the single consideration of race or color, the State indicates that
a candidate’s race or color is an important—perhaps paramount—
consideration in the citizen’s choice, which may decisively influence the
citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines.”149 Our hypothetical, which merely
gave candidates the option of having the state report their race on ballots,
would similarly be constitutionally infirm. The illegitimate purpose of
facilitating private discrimination “by directing the citizen’s attention to the
single consideration of race” would still likely be impermissible
notwithstanding that any discrimination would be the byproduct of state and
private action. The Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama, in striking down
a compulsory disclosure statute, emphasized:
It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive
effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner’s members may have
upon participation by Alabama citizens in petitioner’s activities follows not
from state action but from private community pressures. The crucial factor is
the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial
exertion of state power represented by the production order that private
action takes hold.150

Similarly, it is the interplay of governmental and private action at play with
regard to the email option that raises the question whether “private
community pressures” might unconstitutionally burden individuals’ exercise
of their Second Amendment rights.
As in other areas, the constitutionality of government merely offering to
verify may turn on the government’s underlying purpose.151 The hypothetical
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1964).
Id. at 402. See also Sonu Bedi, Online Dating Sites as Public Accommodations: Facilitating Racial
Discrimination, in FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE (forthcoming Oxford University Press 2019)
(Susan Brison & Katharine Gelber eds.,) (manuscript at 17) (on file with authors) (arguing that by
offering race filtering options, dating websites facilitate private associational discrimination).
150 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
151 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (holding valid laws that were enacted
for a facially neutral reason despite having a racially disparate impact).
148
149
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Louisiana ballot option is unconstitutional because the previously assumed
purpose of facilitating private race discrimination is illegitimate. In contrast, a
state which gave voters the option of having the state publicly disclose that they
had voted is likely not unconstitutional state action even if the state’s purpose in
granting the option was to cause more people to exercise their right to vote
because that government purpose is likely to be deemed legitimate.
The Supreme Court’s abortion decisions make clear that government need
not passively accept how citizens choose to exercise their constitutional rights.
For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court held: “[W]e permit a
State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by
enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed,
even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion.”152 The purpose of expressing a state “preference for childbirth over
abortion” is constitutionally permissible.153
Given this jurisprudence, we think it is likely also constitutionally permissible
for a state to pass laws that have a purpose of expressing a state’s preference for
not bearing arms. The public health concerns of gun deaths each year, numbering
in the tens of thousands, provide ample evidence to support the legitimacy of a
government preference for reducing the prevalence of gun possession. Indeed, it
is hard to imagine a court concluding that “protecting the life of the born” would
not be as legitimate as “protecting the life of the unborn.”
Opponents of the email option might nonetheless argue that the means
of pursuing this government purpose by using “private community pressures”
may unconstitutionally burden the individual’s right to bear arms. In Buckley
v. Valeo, the Supreme Court, in rejecting a facial constitutional challenge to
certain mandated disclosures of campaign contributions, nonetheless carved
out a potential exception “where the threat to the exercise of First
Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure
so insubstantial that the Act’s requirements cannot be constitutionally
applied.”154 The Court worried that “compelled disclosure of a party’s
contributors’ names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals
from either Government officials or private parties.”155

505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007) (“The State has an interest in
ensuring so grave a choice is well informed . . . . It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect
of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to encourage some women to carry the infant
to full term, thus reducing . . . late-term abortions.”).
154 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976).
155 Id. at 74. Subsequently, the Communist Party provided such evidence and was exempted
from disclosing the identity of its contributors. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Hall-Tyner Election
Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1982).
152
153
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Without offering a definitive normative analysis of the constitutional
limits to the government’s ability to act as facilitator, several aspects of our
email options argue strongly in favor of the constitutionality of our proposal.
First, courts have already ruled that compelled public disclosure of gun
permits can be constitutional. In CBS v. Block, the California Supreme Court
upheld the right of “press and public” under the California Public Records
Act to obtain information about the identities of those licensed to possess
concealed weapons, doing so in the face of a dissent which expressly
considered the NAACP v. Alabama possibility that disclosure might expose
licensees to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”156 The Nevada
Supreme Court held similarly in 2010.157 While now legislatively repealed,
New York state law until 2013 compelled disclosure of the identity of all gun
permit holders—thereby identifying all individuals possessing guns.158 In
comparison to this compelled public disclosure of all gun possessors or all
people with concealed carry permits, our email proposal only discloses if the
person electing not to possess chooses to have the registry send emails to
particular addressees. Our registrant-chosen target disclosure emails present
a stronger case for being constitutionally permissible than the compelled
disclosure regimes that have survived repeated challenge.
Our model statute further tailors the scope of the email option to pass
constitutional muster by prohibiting any commercial actor from refusing to
contract on the basis of registry status unless the commercial actor has a
sufficient self-defense interest in discouraging firearm possession by
particular individuals. In Heller, the Supreme Court held that individual
self-defense was “the central component” of the Second Amendment right.159
The right to disassociate with people who possess arms is constitutionally at
its strongest when the person disassociating is also making a decision about
156 725 P.2d 470, 474 (Cal. 1986) (“Defendants’ concern that the release of the information to
the press would increase the vulnerability of licensees is conjectural at best.”); id. at 477 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1985)).
157 Reno Newspapers v. Sheriff, 234 P.3d 922, 927 (Nev. 2010) (“[W]e conclude that Haley has
not met his burden to show that the law enforcement or individual privacy concerns outweigh the
public’s right to access the identity of the permit holder . . . the identity of the permittee and any
post-permit records identifying the permittee are not confidential.”).
158 NY Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Act, S. 2230 § 48(5), 20132014 Reg. Sess. (codified as amended in scattered sections) (N.Y. Jan. 15, 2013); see also J. David
Goodman, Newspaper Takes Down Map of Gun Permit Holders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/nyregion/newspaper-takes-down-map-of-gun-permit-holders.html
[https://perma.cc/62R8-AF2H].
159 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 628 (2008) (stating that the “inherent
right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right”). See also McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (“[I]n Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central
component’ of the Second Amendment right.”).
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how best to defend their home—where, as Heller explained, “the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”160 Thus, our email option
does not just make Second Amendment firearm rights contend with First
Amendment associational rights, but our associational marketplace makes
one person’s self-defense preferences contend with another person’s
constitutionally equal self-defense preferences.
In June 2016, Anne Verrill, the owner of two restaurants in Portland, Maine,
posted a photo of an AR-15 assault rifle along with the message: “If you own
this gun, or you condone the ownership of this gun for private use, you may no
longer enter either of my restaurants.”161 If our email proposal was adopted, one
might imagine that this owner would demand credible evidence that patrons
had waived their right to possess firearms as a precondition of service. But our
self-defense limitation would prohibit such discrimination. While a restaurant
owner has a legitimate basis for prohibiting customers (or others) from carrying
firearms onto her property,162 she does not have a sufficient self-defense basis
for refusing to serve customers who possess firearms remotely. Just as the
Masterpiece Cakeshop baker was prohibited from refusing to make a cake for a
same-sex wedding,163 our proposal would prohibit most retail sellers from
refusing to sell to gun possessors.
With an abundance of caution, our proposal would only allow those who
live with or near the potential registrant or those who have an insurance
interest in the potential waiver’s residence or life to condition their
willingness to contract on waiver. Thus, our model statute would allow
cotenants, landlords, and homeowners’ and condominium associations to
condition an individual’s residency upon registering to waive his or her
Second Amendment rights.164 And as argued above, life and property insurers
as well as landlords have sufficient property interests in defending the
potential waiver’s residence and/or continued life to justify conditioning
insurance or its terms on an individual’s waiver status.
A powerful case could be made for also allowing employers to condition
employment on workers’ nonpossession of firearms. As mentioned above,
Id. at 628.
Katharine Q. Seelye, Think AR-15s Are O.K.? You’re Not Welcome Here, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/think-ar-15s-are-ok-this-restaurant-owner-doesnt-wantyour-business.html (Aug. 1, 2016).
162 See infra Part V.
163 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 370 P.3d 272, 283
(2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (considering whether Free Speech or Free Exercise of Religion
provisions exempt a commercial enterprise from anti-discrimination laws); Jacob Gershman &
Tamara Audi, Court Rules Baker Can’t Refuse to Make Wedding Cake for Gay Couple, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
13, 2015, 6:51 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-rules-baker-cant-refuse-to-make-weddingcake-for-gay-couple-1439506296 [https://perma.cc/2PVY-R4YJ].
164 See infra Appendix.
160
161
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there were 14,770 workplace homicide victims between 1992 and 2012.165 The
very term, “going postal,” derives from “a series of sensational murders at
U.S. Postal Service branches” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.166 A
reasonable employer might decide that employee gun possession makes the
work place less safe. Nonetheless, our model statute prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of waiver status.
While we limit the ability of some commercial contractors to discriminate
on the basis of registry status, we place no such limitation on the
noncommercial associational choices. Private citizens under our proposal
would be free to withhold love, affection, and friendship to people who failed
to register (as signaled by the email option). Neighbors could refuse to
fraternize or allow their kids to have play dates or sleepovers on this basis.
While the associational First Amendment rights of commercial actors, like
their free-speech First Amendment rights, are subject to constitutional
restriction,167 we are chary to restrict the associational rights of
noncommercial individuals and organizations.168 Individuals’ choice not to
renounce their Second Amendment rights might limit their ability to interact
with others in noneconomic spheres, but they remain free to find their own
communities of kindred spirits.
In weighing the burdens of the email option on the self-defense choices of
potential registrants, it is essential to also take into account the concomitant benefits
that the email option produces with regard to the same constitutional values. For
example, consider a potential registrant who only registers because of the
associational pressure of losing the right to associate with a neighbor who
conditions their association on receiving an email. We can say that the registrant’s
self-defense choices were burdened by the email option (and the possibility of
associational pressure that it created). But the email option furthers the associational
interests and self-defense interests of the neighbor. The neighbor can make more
informed associational choices and thereby further her self-defense preference of
being less exposed to potentially armed interactions. A similar analysis applies to
those potential registrants who, when faced with association, pressure still choose
not to register. We can again say that the nonregistrant’s self-defense choices were
burdened by the email option, because the price of bearing arms is forgoing
association with the neighbor. But the email option again furthers the association
and self-defense of the neighbor who by disassociation can again further her selfdefense preference of being less exposed to potentially armed interactions. In both

See CDC, supra note 107.
See LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING
DISABILITY RIGHTS 192 (2010).
167 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see also Gershman & Audi, supra note 163.
168 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
165
166

2019]

Gun (Self) Control

967

these cases, there is a symmetry of constitutional interests. However, there is a final
pairing where the email option furthers the associational interests of both the
registrant and the (pressuring) neighbor. Without the email option, there may be
people who want to register independent of any associational pressure who are still
unable to engage in certain forms of association because they are not able to credibly
communicate their unarmed status to their neighbor. In this situation, the email
option furthers the constitutional interests of both the registrant and the neighbors
because the credible signal of registry allows them to achieve association that also
comports with their shared self-defense choice that the registrant not be armed.
Thus, even if a court were to assess the associational pressure of the neighbor as
constitutional burden, it would need to balance the offsetting benefits regarding
the same associational and self-defense interests.
Stepping back, we have proposed a system of limited government intervention
to promote informed association by reporting registration only when commercial
contractors without sufficient self-defense interests—including employers and
virtually all retailers of goods and services—would be prohibited from
discriminating against someone for failing to waive the rights to purchase or possess
firearms.169 The email option is a modest form of state action where the state in a
sense agrees to pass along a registrant message to particular addressees (and by
doing so verifies that the registry or revocation has in fact occurred). While the
exact contours of any possible constitutional duty on government to refrain from
facilitating associational preferences are debatable, we are confident our proposed
email option—given (1) the constitutionality of compelled public disclosure of
various gun permits and (2) our prohibiting associational discrimination by
commercial contractors without sufficient self-defense interests in the firearm
choices of others—passes constitutional muster.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Our proposal could be implemented by a congressional statute adding
individuals who registered to waive their purchase and possession rights as an
additional NICS category. However, federal firearms legislation has
historically been difficult to pass.170 A more politically viable alternative is for

169 With regard to all of these contractors, an individual’s right to bear arms would be
market-inalienable. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850
(1987) (“Something that is market-inalienable is not to be sold, which in our economic system
means it is not to be traded in the market.”).
170 Jonathan Weisman, Gun Control Drive Blocked in Senate; Obama, In Defeat, Sees ‘Shameful
Day,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1. Even lifting the ban on federal funding of gun research
is highly contested. David Smith, Obama Looks to Expand Background Checks for Guns with
Executive Action: White House Says It Is Also Exploring So-Called Gun Show Loophole As House
Democrats Push To Have Federal Ban on Gun Violence Research Funding Lifted, THE GUARDIAN
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individual states to implement the proposal by exploiting an existing state
option to expand NICS coverage. The existing federal background check
system already allows states to add categories of covered individuals into the
NICS system, because under the federal law, the NICS system prohibits
transfer of a firearm where barred by federal or state law.171 Individual states
have already taken advantage of this option to expand the class of prohibited
individuals. For example, Illinois prohibits people who have voluntarily
admitted themselves within the past five years to “a mental institution for
mental health treatment.”172 In effect, Illinois already has a version of our
proposed libertarian gun control, because by volunteering to be admitted, an
individual waives the right to possess or purchase firearms for the next five
years. As of 2017, more than 1,000,000 individuals were included in NICS
solely because they were prohibited from possessing firearms under state law
(and hence under NICS are categorized as “state prohibitors”).173
An individual state could accordingly implement our proposal for “libertarian
gun control” by simply creating a state waiver registry and passing legislation
making it illegal for residents who register to possess or purchase firearms. This
state statute would thereby create a new prohibitor category, and the residents
who registered with the state would then automatically qualify for inclusion in
the NICS system. The state on an ongoing basis would forward registrant
information to the FBI,174 and the resident registrants would then be barred from
purchasing firearms anywhere in the nation.
In fact, by creating a new category of individuals who cannot lawfully
possess firearms, a state cannot only prevent its resident registrants from
purchasing guns in other states, but it may also prevent nonresidents from
purchasing guns in that state. As explained in the FBI’s Federal Firearm
Licensee Manual, “The National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS) is required to deny the transfer of a firearm to any individual who is
found to be prohibited under state law, i.e., under the law of the purchaser’s
(U.K.) (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/10/obama-backgroundchecks-guns-executive-action-gun-show-loophole [https://perma.cc/C7BZ-SH3V].
171 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(4), (5) (2018); F.B.I., supra note 9.
172 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-3.1 (2015). Illinois is not alone. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1448(a)(2) (2018); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.03(a)(6) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129(b)(2)(J);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131(d)(ii) (2018); State v. Dunham, No. 9812012054, 1999 WL 1223767,
at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1999) (“[T]he person’s voluntariness is irrelevant . . . .”).
173 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
174 The NICS system allows states to choose whether to maintain their own databases for at
least some background checks. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.2 (providing that state point of contact can “check
state and local record systems,” as well as NICS). As of 2013, in 36 states, dealers contacted the FBI
directly for all background checks. F.B.I., supra note 9, at 3. But all states have the option of passing
on names of persons who fall into a prohibited possession category to the FBI, so our proposal would
merely be adding a new prohibitor category that could be transmitted. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.4 (stating
that reporting by states to NICS is voluntary).
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state of residence and/or the law of the state where the transfer occurs.”175 As
shown in Table 2, a state’s prohibitor category would not apply only if the
person with the prohibitor characteristic was not a resident of the prohibitor
state and was not attempting to purchase in the prohibitor state. Accordingly,
if a single state passed such a “No Guns Registry” statute, it could create a
small commitment gift for residents of other states as well, because these
residents of other states who registered with the passing states registry would
be barred from purchasing guns in the passing state.
Table 3: Extraterritorial Effect of State Prohibitor
(including “No Guns” Waiver) Categories

Place of
Residence

Prohibiting State
Non-Prohibiting
State

Place of Purchase or Possession
Non-Prohibiting
Prohibiting
State
State
Applies
Applies
Applies
Does Not Apply

Moreover, our proposed statute provides for reciprocity that would allow a
subset of states to increase the footprint of a registration’s effect. Crucially, the
statute provides that “registering in any other state that adopts an analogous
‘No Guns’ registry renders possession of a firearm illegal” in other passing
jurisdictions.176 Thus, if California and Illinois both passed the model statute,
then anyone who registered in either state could not then legally possess in
either state. We do not anticipate that our model statute would be enacted in

175 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEE MANUAL 2 (last visited Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics [https://perma.cc/7G8G-7NGJ]. But cf. Mance v. Holder, 74 F.
Supp. 3d 795, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (holding interstate handgun transfer ban unconstitutional); 27
C.F.R. § 478.99 (barring interstate handgun transfers and stating that sellers may not sell to buyers
who are too young under state law “applicable at the place of sale”). The broadest reading of “State
law,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(4), (5), under the federal background check statute would prevent purchase
in every state by anyone barred by any state’s law. Longstanding principles of extraterritoriality and
choice-of-law militate against such an interpretation. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669
(1892) (“Crimes and offenses against the laws of any state can only be defined, prosecuted, and
pardoned by the sovereign authority of that state.”). But they do not preclude it: “[C]oncerns
regarding extraterritorial effects of state law are misplaced. We are dealing with a federal statute which
has incorporated state law into its application. Upon incorporation, that state law became a part of
the federal statutory scheme; so, it is federal law being given effect, not state law.” In re Stockburger,
192 B.R. 908, 910 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
176 See infra Appendix, Section 3.
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many states at once, but we can easily imagine gradual passage by states that
have shown an appetite for various other firearms restrictions.177
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have laid out a plan for a new kind of gun control that is
inexpensive, politically feasible, and likely, within just a few years, to save
thousands of lives. Our proposal to allow individuals to waive their Second
Amendment rights is inexpensive because it merely calls for an online registry to
supplement the existing NICS system. Our proposal does not add any additional
burdens on gun dealers who already have to query the NICS system before selling.
The “No Guns Registry” is politically feasible not only because of its
libertarian and freedom-enhancing quality, but also because it can be
implemented by individual states without requiring Congressional action.
Indeed, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia have
already enacted a version of our proposal by allowing individuals to opt into
the NICS system by volunteering to be committed for mental health
purposes. There are good reasons why we might be concerned about such
waivers via voluntary commitment, as the individuals at the moment of
voluntary commitment may have reduced decisional capacity and we worry
that the Second Amendment consequences of waiver are not sufficiently
disclosed. It is worrisome that people in these states are forced to give up
their constitutional right as a pre-condition for receiving mental health care.
But our proposal avoids these concerns. The registry does not systematically
target people in extremis and fully discloses the consequences of waiver,
including the process for subsequently rescinding the waiver. Moreover, the
option of waiver is not a government required quid pro quo for mental health
or any other services. While our email option allows individual neighbors,
cotenants, and insurers to require waiver as an associational prerequisite,
nonwaiving individuals are free to seek out other associational communities
making different self-defense decisions.
177 States that are already voluntarily reporting to NICS large numbers of people disqualified
by federal mental health restrictions might be the most likely to enact. The top ten reporting states
are Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, Delaware, California, Washington, Michigan, New York,
Texas, and Colorado. EVERYTOWN, CLOSING THE GAPS: STRENGTHENING THE BACKGROUND
CHECK SYSTEM TO KEEP GUNS AWAY FROM THE DANGEROUSLY MENTALLY ILL 12 (2014).
Under the FBI’s current interpretation that “state law” includes either the transaction state or the
buyer’s state of residence, see supra text accompanying note 175, residents of any state that passes the model
statute would be barred from purchasing nationwide. But the reciprocity would broaden the scope of
resident registrants in the circumstance that the federal government limited NICS to the place of
transaction. Under that interpretation, a registrant in California would be barred from purchasing in either
California or Illinois. To implement reciprocity, enacting states would need to share registrant information
with other each other (as is provided in Section 2 of the model statute). See Appendix.
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The “No Guns Registry” sees government not simply as a source of
mandates and prohibitions but as a platform that can facilitate citizens
coming together to make common cause.178 Instead of traditional state action,
the government as platform merely facilitates citizen action. Our registry
platform not only facilitates the associational marketplace of those most
affected by individual gun-acquisition decisions, it allows millions of
geographically dispersed Americans to publicly signal their aggregate
willingness to dispense with firearms.
While we have structured our proposal to appeal to people with varying
political commitments, reasonable people might nonetheless oppose this
enhancement of individual freedom. People might oppose the email option
because they predict that a disassociation market place will reduce social
cohesion by unhelpfully moving us toward an overly transparent world in which
citizens can base their willingness to interact on a host of personal choices that
have been largely shrouded. Alternatively, people might oppose the registry
more generally out of a fear that it might either facilitate or impede the
enactment of other gun-control measures. For example, citizens who would
have supported an across-the-board mandatory waiting period as a
commitment device may become quiescent once they can opt for their own. Or
the legislative energy necessary to enact a waiver registry may divert attention
from other gun control initiatives that might have larger impacts on public
safety.179 On the other hand, if the associational marketplace “decides” that a
substantial majority of citizens support waiver, this demonstration of support
might lead legislators toward imposing a waiting period before all gun sales.
But to condition one’s support crudely on whether our proposal is likely
to increase or decrease the prevalence of private possession of firearms
continues the divisive trap that has plagued our national debate on gun
control. The associational marketplace lets the people decide what kinds of
self-defense communities they desire. It acknowledges the varying spillover
effects that one person’s decision to possess may have on others and on his or
her future self. Giving people the right to waive their gun rights is not a
silver-bullet solution to gun violence, but it is a low-cost and pragmatic
enhancement of our liberty that can, by garnering the substantial support our
two studies demonstrate, predictably save hundreds of lives each year.

178 See Ayres, supra note 47, at 33 (“[T]he same advances in technology that have made
Kickstarter and Groupon possible can be leveraged to allow new sets of similarly-minded citizens to
make common cause.”).
179 Analogous possible demotivating effects of personal freedom can be found in many
contexts. Giving retailers the individual option of banning guns in their stores may discourage them
from lobbying for mandatory gun control. Giving individual passengers the option of seatbelts may
discourage them from lobbying for air bags.
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APPENDIX
MODEL FIREARM SELF-RESTRICTION ACT
SYNOPSIS: Under current law, people who fear that they may become a
risk to themselves or others are not allowed to restrict their legal ability to
purchase firearms.
This bill would authorize people to add their own names into the
background check system to protect themselves and others against impulsive
gun violence.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF [STATE]:
Section 1. [The STATE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR NICS
REPORTING] within one year of the passage of this Act shall develop and
launch a secure Internet-based platform to allow any person residing in the
United States to register to add their name to the “[STATE] No Guns
Registry.”
(a) The [AGENCY] shall ensure that this Internet-based platform
credibly (i) verifies the identity of any persons who opt to register, (ii)
prevents unauthorized disclosures of any registering persons, and (iii)
informs the individual of the legal effects of registration.
(b) In addition, the Internet-based platform shall provide registrants
with an email notification option that shall allow registered individuals to
identify at the time of registration or thereafter one or more email addresses.
The platform will separately ask whether a registrant wishes to provide the
email addresses of his or her physician or healthcare provider. The platform
shall notify any such email addressees that the individual has registered his
or her name with the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” and has thereby waived
his or her right to bear arms, and the platform shall also notify any such
addressees if the individual subsequently seeks to rescind his or her waiver.
Providing email contact information constitutes an express authorization of
such use of records.
Section 2. Once the Internet-based platform becomes operative, any
person may request via the platform to be added to the “[STATE] No Guns
Registry.” The [AGENCY] shall on an ongoing basis forward registry
information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be entered into the
NICS Index Denied Persons File, and to any other state that adopts an
analogous “No Guns Registry.”
Section 3. Registering for the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” or
registering in any other state that adopts an analogous “No Guns Registry”
renders possession of a firearm illegal in [STATE]. If a person is in the NICS
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due to registering in [STATE] or in another state, receipt of a firearm from
a person or entity required to perform a background check violates [STATE]
law. Knowing possession of a firearm by a person validly registered on the
“No Guns Registry” is punishable by a fine of up to $500. Transfer of a firearm
to a person on the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” by any person or entity
required to perform a background check, either knowingly or due to a failure
to perform a background check, is punishable by a fine up to $10,000 and/or
imprisonment for no more than one year.
Section 4. A person who has registered with the “[STATE] No Guns
Registry” may subsequently request that his or her name be removed from
the registry by a secure method conveyed to the [STATE]’s Internet-based
platform. The [AGENCY] shall wait twenty-one days after receipt before
notifying the FBI to remove the requesting person from the NICS Index
Denied Persons File and then the [AGENCY] shall purge any and all records
of the sign up, transactions, and removal. A person who has registered with
the [STATE] No Guns Registry may deregister by applying for immediate
deregistration to a Superior Court and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that he or she is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
safety (including danger to self) in a proceeding where any public official or
interested party may also present evidence.
Section 5. A person who knowingly makes a false statement regarding
their identity on the voluntary waiver of firearm rights form or revocation of
waiver of firearm rights form is guilty of false swearing under [cite relevant
section].
Section 6. (a) In employment, education, government benefits, and
contracting, it shall be illegal to inquire whether an individual under this
Section has requested to be added to or removed from the “[STATE] No
Guns Registry” and it shall be illegal to take action based such information.
However, notwithstanding the foregoing prohibition, it shall not be illegal
for an insurer with regard to life, homeowners’ or renter’s insurance to inquire
or base the terms, premia, or issuance of insurance on such information. Nor
shall it be illegal for a cotenant, landlord, homeowner’s association, or
condominium association to condition terms of ownership, tenancy,
occupancy, or status as an invitee on such information.
(b) Individuals or organizations who learn, from the “[STATE] No Guns
Registry” or otherwise, the identity of someone who has requested to be
added to or removed from the registry shall have a duty not to disclose that
information to others unless the individual or organization receives separate
nonregistry authorization from the waiving individual to share that
information. Violation of this section shall be criminally punishable by a fine
of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for no more than one year.
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Section 7. A person voluntarily presenting in an acute-care hospital or a
satellite emergency facility who is reasonably believed by the treating clinician
to be suffering from a diagnosis of depression, using standardized definition of
such diagnosis as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders as published by the American Psychiatric Association, shall be
presented with the opportunity of registering on the Internet-based “[STATE]
No Guns Registry.” Any suicide hotline maintained or operated by any entity
funded in whole or part by the state shall inform callers about the opportunity
of registering with the registry. All Department of Motor Vehicle offices
serving the public shall offer individuals the opportunity of registering on the
Internet-based “[STATE] No Guns Registry.”

